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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Today Alaskans are talking about how to close the huge budget deficit the state government is facing, 
with the oil revenues it has depended on for decades now a small fraction of what they once were. 
Alaska has had budget deficits for several years, and it has made budget cuts—but it has mainly relied 
on billions of dollars in savings from the Constitutional Budget Reserve and other funds to cover the 
deficit. Those savings are dwindling, and the state needs to take measures to close the deficit.  
An important consideration is how various ways of reducing the deficit might affect Alaska’s economy. 
This study compares potential short-run economic effects of 11 options the state might take in the next 
few years to reduce the deficit and that are sustainable over the long term. We looked at economic 
effects of several types of spending cuts and taxes, as well as reducing the Permanent Fund dividend—
the annual cash payment the state makes to all residents—and saving less of Permanent Fund earnings. 
We’re not advocating or opposing any option: our purpose is to estimate and compare the magnitude of 
the short-run economic effects of different ways of reducing the deficit. Broadly speaking: 
• Different ways of collecting money from Alaskans affect those with lower and higher incomes in 
significantly different ways. 
• Anything the state does to reduce the deficit will cost the economy jobs and money. But spending 
some of the Permanent Fund earnings the state currently saves would not have short-run economic 
effects. Saving less would, however, slow Permanent Fund growth and reduce future earnings.   
• Because the deficit is so big, the overall economic effects of closing the deficit will also be big. 
Effects on Individual Alaskans of New Taxes or Smaller Permanent Fund Dividends 
We looked at how paying various taxes and or getting smaller Permanent Fund dividends would reduce 
Alaskans’ disposable incomes—the amount they have to spend. To compare across options, we 
estimated how much raising $100 million in revenues would cost Alaskans at different income levels. 
• Dividend cuts would cost the poorest Alaskans the most, both in dollars and percentages of income. 
For $100 million in revenue raised, the poorest Alaskans would lose about $150 each, or more than 3% 
of their disposable income. By comparison, the wealthiest Alaskans would lose about 0.1% per person.  
 • Income taxes would affect the highest-income Alaskans the most—for $100 million of revenue raised, 
they would each pay about $600, or 0.5%, of their disposable incomes. Middle-income Alaskans would 
pay around 0.2% of their incomes, and the poorest would pay little—because they have little income. 
 
 
ES-2 
 
• Sales and property taxes would have intermediate effects. Wealthier Alaskans would pay the most in 
sales taxes or property taxes—about 0.2% of their disposable income per person, for $100 million of 
revenue raised—because they spend more and own more valuable property. But sales or property taxes 
would cost poorer Alaskans a bigger percentage of income—around 0.5% to 1% per person of their 
disposable income.    
• The effects of taxes on Alaskans would be reduced because tourists and non-residents would pay part. 
Tourists and non-resident workers would pay about 10% of sales taxes, non-resident workers would pay 
close to 7% of income taxes, and non-residents would pay about 11% of a property tax.   
• Reduced federal income taxes would also partly offset state taxes and reduced dividends. Alaskans 
who itemize deductions could deduct some state tax from their federal taxes. Reduced federal taxes 
would offset about 9% to 11% of state income taxes, 7% to 8% of sales taxes, and 9% of a property tax. 
And since the federal government taxes dividends, about 16% of a cut in dividends would be offset by 
reduced federal taxes. 
 
Short-Run Economic Effects of Fiscal Options 
We just described the direct effects various taxes or a smaller Permanent Fund dividend could have on 
disposable incomes of Alaskans. Cuts in state spending would also directly cost some Alaskans jobs and 
income. But all the fiscal options that directly reduce incomes or eliminate jobs also have broader, 
additional effects, called “multiplier” effects. That’s because the households and businesses directly 
affected in turn spend less for goods and services—costing the economy more jobs and income. 
It’s impossible to know just how much households and businesses would reduce spending. So we made 
low and high estimates of the overall (direct plus multiplier) short-run economic losses under various 
fiscal options, based on reasonable but different assumptions about changes in household and business 
spending.   
The only option we assessed that would create no short-run job and income losses is saving less of the 
Permanent Fund earnings—that is, helping reduce the deficit by using some earnings that are currently 
added to the fund principal to protect it from inflation, or added to the Permanent Fund earnings reserve 
(approximately half of realized earnings over time). But as noted earlier, in the long run saving less 
would reduce fund growth and so reduce earnings.  
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The figure shows estimated job and income losses under 10 fiscal options, for $100 million of deficit 
reduction. It’s clear that the effects of closing the deficit through state spending cuts vary substantially, 
depending on the types of cuts. 
• Closing the deficit just by 
cutting state jobs would cost the 
economy the most jobs—as many 
as 1,677 jobs for a $100 million 
reduction in the deficit. That’s 
because the losses would include 
direct state jobs and additional 
jobs due to reduced spending.   
• By contrast, cutting spending by 
reducing state workers’ pay 
would eliminate only about a 
third to half as many jobs—but 
the income losses would be about 
the same as for cutting state jobs. 
• Dividend cuts would have the 
greatest short-run effects on 
income—in the range of $130 
million to $150 million in losses 
for $100 million in deficit 
reduction. That’s because they 
would have the largest direct 
effects on incomes of all 
Alaskans—and they would 
disproportionately affect low-
income Alaskans, who spend 
more of their income.   
• Taxes would be partly paid by 
non-residents, so they have 
smaller direct impacts on 
incomes—and therefore the 
multiplier effects are smaller. 
Income, sales, or property taxes 
would cost the economy around 
$115 million to $135 million per 
$100 million of deficit reduction. 
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Regional Differences in Economic Effects 
We couldn’t analyze in detail the differences in economic effects different fiscal options would have in 
regions of Alaska. But we know those effects would vary, partly because income distribution varies by 
region. Those where incomes tend to be lower—for example, in areas of western Alaska—are likely to 
be more affected by dividend cuts and sales taxes. Regions with generally higher incomes—like parts of 
Southcentral and Southeast Alaska—would tend to be more affected by income taxes. 
Also, the economies of different regions depend more or less on state-funded jobs and services. Juneau, 
for example, where more than one-quarter of wages and salaries are from state government, would 
clearly be more affected by cuts in state jobs than the North Slope Borough, where state wages make up 
only 1% of wages. But many rural areas depend more than urban places on state spending that helps pay 
for local government—like revenue sharing and schools.  
And regions that depend the most on trade and service industries—Anchorage, for example—would be 
more affected by the multiplier effects of fiscal options. 
 
Conclusions 
Within a few years we will have to greatly reduce the deficit. Reducing the deficit will have significant 
effects on Alaska’s economy, regardless of how or when we do it.  Trying to fully close the deficit in 
one year would have a very large impact on an economy already weakened by cuts in oil-industry jobs 
and past cuts in state capital spending.   
But not making significant progress toward reducing the deficit would also cause significant harm, 
including increased business and consumer uncertainty, reduced private investment, and further 
downgrading of Alaska’s credit rating.  Our economic adjustment to lower oil revenues will be smoother 
if we substantially reduce the deficit this year and clearly demonstrate to Alaskans, businesses, and 
investors that we will make the necessary further changes in spending, revenues, and uses of Permanent 
Fund earnings—so we can achieve sustainable state finances, reduce uncertainty about future state 
spending and how we pay for it, and build confidence in Alaska’s fiscal future. 
And finally, all the options for closing the budget deficit would affect Alaska’s economy and society in 
many important ways that go beyond the short-term economic impacts we estimated for this study.  We 
should base our fiscal choices not only on their short-term impacts but also their effects on Alaska’s 
economy and society over time.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaska’s state government faces a very serious fiscal challenge. This year’s (FY16) General 
Fund spending greatly exceeds current and projected future General Fund revenues, and there 
have also been budget deficits in the past several years. We have been paying for the deficits 
mostly by drawing down savings in the Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund (CBRF) and other 
funds.  But our savings are limited, and within a few years we will have to significantly reduce 
the deficit. 
Alaskans are currently engaged in an important discussion of how and when we should close the 
deficit. Among the important considerations in this discussion are the impacts these choices 
might have on Alaska’s economy. This study looks at some of these potential short-run 
economic impacts of a range of fiscal options. 
 
Fiscal Options 
We use the term “fiscal option” to refer to sustainable approaches the state might take within the 
next three years to reduce the deficit.  We define the “deficit” as the difference between the 
state’s unrestricted General Fund appropriations and revenues.   
We estimated both revenue impacts and short-run economic impacts of the 11 fiscal options 
summarized in Table I-1.  We use the term “revenue impacts” to refer to how much income the 
tax and dividend-cut options would collect from (or not pay to) Alaska residents and non-
residents, by income group.  We use the term “short-run economic impacts” (or sometimes 
“economic impacts”) to refer to the short-run direct and multiplier impacts the fiscal options 
would have on Alaska jobs and income. We also assessed the potential revenue impacts of 
increasing several types of excise taxes (Table I-2). 
 
Table I-1 
Fiscal Options for Which We Analyzed Both Revenue Impacts and Economic Impacts 
Fiscal option Description 
Spending cut: workers A spending cut achieved entirely by reducing the state workforce 
Spending cut: broad-based A spending cut achieved by a broad range of cuts to state spending 
Spending cut: capital A spending cut achieved by cutting the capital budget 
Spending cut: pay A spending cut achieved entirely by reducing the pay of state workers 
Income tax: progressive Constant percentage of the taxpayer’s federal individual income tax liability 
Income tax: flat rate Constant percentage of federal taxable income 
Sales tax: more exclusions Four percent sales tax on retail expenditures, excluding food at home, health care, 
education, and shelter 
Sales tax: fewer exclusions Three percent sales tax on retail expenditures, excluding health care and education 
Property tax 20 mil (2 percent) tax assessed on real and personal property, with an exclusion for 
the amount of property taxes currently paid to local governments 
Dividend cut Reducing Permanent Fund dividends and diverting that amount of Permanent Fund 
earnings to fund General Fund spending 
Saving less Using some of the annual Permanent Fund earnings that are currently saved in the 
Permanent Fund (either in the principal as inflation proofing or in the earnings 
reserve) to fund General Fund spending.  We exclude uses of earnings above the 
average level of earnings not used for dividends, because using more than the 
average would draw down the Permanent Fund earnings reserve over time. 
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Table I-2 
Fiscal Options for Which We Analyzed Only Revenue Impacts 
Fiscal option Description 
Excise tax: motor fuels Increase in the state motor fuels tax 
Excise tax: alcohol Increase in state alcoholic beverages tax 
Excise tax: tobacco Increase in the state tobacco tax 
 
In choosing fiscal options to analyze for this study, we tried to select a range of options that met 
the following criteria: 
 
• Options that are part of the political discussion: options that are currently being discussed 
as potential ways of reducing the deficit. 
• Short-term options:  options that could, if implemented, reduce the deficit within the next 
three years.  Thus, we didn’t analyze options that would take longer to affect state 
revenues or spending—such as encouraging new kinds of economic development that 
might generate new royalty or tax income in the future.  
• Sustainable options: options that would be sustainable over time.  Thus, we did not study 
options for closing the deficit by drawing down funds such as the Permanent Fund 
earnings reserve, or other smaller funds such as the Power Cost Equalization Fund.  
Although drawing down these funds would be a potential way of paying for General 
Fund deficits for a while, it would not be sustainable over the long run.  Note, however, 
that using Permanent Fund earnings currently being added to the Permanent Fund 
principal (to protect it from inflation) or to the Permanent Fund earnings reserve could be 
sustainable—as long as the average use of such earnings over time did not result in 
drawing down the average balance of the earnings reserve.   
• Options within the state’s control:  If oil prices or production increased, state oil revenues 
could increase and reduce the deficit, without any of the economic impacts that would 
result from spending cuts, new taxes, or dividend cuts. While we can hope that oil prices 
and revenues increase, and while we may wish to assume some level of increases in oil 
revenues as we respond to the state’s fiscal challenge, we cannot control whether and to 
what extent they will increase.  Thus, we did not include higher oil revenues or other 
potential revenue increases that are beyond the state’s control as fiscal options for 
reducing the deficit.  
• Options we were able to analyze:  options that we had the time, funding, and expertise to 
analyze.  Thus, we didn’t analyze complex options such as potential changes in oil credits 
or oil taxes; changes in taxes on specific industries such as fishing or mining; or changes 
in how the state delivers services—such as K-12 education, the University of Alaska, or 
Medicaid—that might affect costs and spending.  These are examples of options that 
might significantly reduce the deficit and are receiving substantial attention.  But they are 
all sufficiently complex that analyzing their potential economic impacts would require 
detailed and specific analysis far beyond the scope of what we had time or funding (and 
in some cases expertise) to analyze for this study. 
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We are not advocating or opposing any of the fiscal options we studied, nor are we offering any 
conclusions about whether they are practical or politically feasible.  Our purpose is only to 
inform the ongoing important discussion about potential options for reducing the deficit. 
 
Organization of this Report 
Chapter II of this report discusses revenue impacts of the tax and dividend-cut options—these are 
options that would reduce Alaskans’ incomes, either because Alaskans would pay taxes or 
receive smaller Permanent Fund dividends. We estimate how much revenue each option would 
collect from household groups at ten different income levels, both as dollar amounts and as a 
relative share of each group’s income.  We also estimate the extent to which these revenue 
collections would be offset by reduced federal taxes, and how much of the taxes non-residents 
would pay. Finally, we estimate how the losses in disposable income under each option could 
affect Alaskans’ spending—those estimated changes in spending drive the “multiplier” effects on 
the economy discussed in Chapter III. 
 
Chapter III discusses the potential short-run effects of the fiscal options on income and jobs in 
Alaska.  The various options would raise different total amounts of revenue, so to compare 
effects across options, we estimated the short-run economic impacts of each option per $100 
million of deficit reduction. 
 
Chapter IV briefly discusses potential regional differences in the revenue and short-run economic 
impacts of different fiscal options.   
 
Chapter V discusses the potential total impacts on the economy of reducing the deficit, and how 
these impacts might be affected by how fast the deficit is reduced. 
  
Chapter VI briefly describes potential longer-term and indirect economic and social impacts of 
various fiscal options, which we did not study for this report.  These other kinds of impacts are 
important, but they were beyond the scope of what we were able to study.   
 
Limitations of the Analysis 
It is important to recognize several limitations of the analysis reported in this study. 
 
The devil is in the details.  With the exception of dividend cuts, all the fiscal options we studied 
are “generic” options.  But for any spending cut or tax option, the devil is in the details:  the 
actual impacts would depend on specific details of how the spending cuts were made or how the 
taxes were structured.  Our estimates of the impacts of each fiscal option reflect specific 
assumptions about how the option might be implemented.  If it were implemented differently, the 
impacts might differ. 
 
Our ability to analyze impacts of spending cuts is limited by uncertainty about how they would 
be implemented.  The potential economic impacts of spending cuts depend greatly on what 
would be cut.  Some kinds of spending cuts would have much greater impacts than others. We 
analyzed four “generic” spending cut options, to contrast the impacts of different kinds of cuts—
ranging from those that might have the highest economic impacts (cuts in the state workforce or 
state worker pay) to cuts that would have lower economic impacts (broad-based cuts or cuts in 
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capital spending).  None of the impacts of these generic spending cut options are necessarily the 
same as the actual economic impacts of specific cuts the state might make, and that might be 
characterized using the same names.  Nor are all the options necessarily feasible for large-scale 
cuts.  For example, the FY16 capital budget is only $118 million, so a (hypothetical) $500 
million cut in state capital spending would not be possible. 
  
Our ability to analyze impacts is limited by available data.  Analyzing how much different fiscal 
options might contribute to reducing the deficit and what the impacts on Alaskans and the Alaska 
economy might be requires making many assumptions about factors such as incomes of 
Alaskans, how much non-residents spend in Alaska for different kinds of products, marginal 
federal tax rates Alaskans pay, how Alaskans spend money, and how Alaskans might change 
their spending in response to changes in their incomes.  We developed assumptions based on the 
best available data, but in many cases the data to develop necessary assumptions were limited or 
non-existent—so we had to use our best judgment.  As a result, some of our estimates are 
inherently uncertain:  different reasonable assumptions would have resulted in different 
estimates.  In general, because we used consistent assumptions for all the options, we are more 
confident in our estimates of the relative economic impacts of different options than in their total 
economic impacts.  In the following chapters we discuss the most important areas of uncertainty, 
and how different assumptions might change the report conclusions.   
 
Our estimates of short-run impacts exclude some potential impacts.  To analyze short-run 
economic impacts in Chapter III, we used a standard economic technique known as “economic 
impact modeling” and a commonly used model known as “IMPLAN.”  This approach and this 
model are widely used in Alaska and elsewhere.  The technique is the best available for 
estimating how a change in spending or income attributable to a particular industry or 
government policy “ripples” through the economy as a result of further changes in spending 
flows between industries and households.  But it does not account for potential behavioral 
adjustments in spending, wage rates, prices, or migration to and from Alaska. The best way to 
interpret our estimates is to say that they reflect immediate income and jobs losses resulting from 
less money circulating in the economy. 
 
As Chapter VI discusses, our analysis focused only on potential revenue impacts and short-run 
economic impacts of selected fiscal options.  All the options would have longer-term economic 
impacts that are harder to predict and that we did not analyze—but such impacts are also 
potentially as important or more important than the short-term economic impacts we did analyze.   
 
Our analysis offers useful perspectives on some of the potential economic impacts of the fiscal 
options we studied.   But it is not sufficient to support conclusions about whether any option is 
“good” or “bad” (or “best” or “worst”).  Ultimately, Alaska’s fiscal choices will significantly 
affect Alaska’s future economy and society in many ways beyond the short-term economic 
impacts we analyzed.  In thinking about our fiscal options, we should consider not only their 
short-term economic impacts but also their longer-term economic and social impacts. 
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Report Funding 
ISER’s preparation of this report was supported with funding from the Alaska Department of 
Revenue and the Office of Management and Budget. Each agency provided $30,000.   
 
Study Independence 
As with all ISER research, this report and its conclusions are solely the work of the individual 
authors and should be attributed to them, not to ISER, the University of Alaska Anchorage, or 
the research sponsors. Neither of the funding agencies influenced the conclusions of the report.  
We decided what fiscal options to study, what kinds of economic impacts to study, how we 
studied them, and what we wrote about our conclusions. 
 
In our study design, analysis, and conclusions we are not advocating or opposing any fiscal 
options or choices the state may make.  Our purpose is solely to help inform the important 
discussion occurring in Alaska about how and when to close the deficit.  While we believe that 
the information in this report is relevant to this discussion, it is not sufficient to draw conclusions 
about which options the state should choose.  Many other factors besides the short-term 
economic impact matter in this discussion—including value choices about what kind of economy 
and society Alaskans want.   
 
Our findings and conclusions are limited to those in this report and in presentations we have 
prepared.  We have attempted to describe and emphasize the limitations of our analysis.  Other 
people may argue for or against fiscal options or choices based on their interpretations of our 
findings, or may not acknowledge the limitations of our analysis.  We have no control over how 
other people interpret or use our findings: what they say we said is not necessarily what we said. 
 
Study Authors 
Gunnar Knapp directed this research and led the analysis and writing of Chapters I, IV, and V.  
Matt Berman led the analysis of revenue impacts reported in Chapter II and Appendixes A and 
B.  Mouhcine Guettabi led the analysis of short-run economic impacts reported in Chapter III 
and Appendixes C and D.  Technical questions about the analysis should be directed to the lead 
authors at Gunnar.Knapp@uaa.alaska.edu, Matthew.Berman@uaa.alaska.edu, and 
mguettabi@alaska.edu. 
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II. REVENUE IMPACTS OF TAXES AND DIVIDEND CUTS 
In this chapter we discuss the potential revenue impacts of imposing several types of taxes and of 
reducing Permanent Fund dividends—the annual cash payment the state makes to all residents. 
We looked at the relative shares of state revenue each measure would raise from different Alaska 
income groups and from non-residents, as well as the extent to which the revenues collected 
would be offset by reductions in federal taxes Alaskans pay.  This chapter summarizes our 
results.  Appendix A provides technical details of the methodology and results.  
Raising revenue through any tax, or by cutting the dividend, will have some adverse effect on the 
economy—because taking money out of the private economy reduces the amount households 
have to spend. But different revenue measures have different effects on household spending. 
Three main factors explain the differences in how specific revenue measures affect spending:  
(1) the share of revenues contributed by non-residents, (2) the share of revenues offset by 
reductions in federal taxes, and (3) the distribution of the effects of a given revenue measure on 
households at different income levels. A fiscal measure is considered progressive if the 
percentage collected rises as income rises, and regressive if the percentage falls as income rises. 
Alaskans with lower incomes typically spend a larger share of their income than those with 
higher incomes—so more regressive measures will reduce spending more than less regressive or 
progressive measures.  
Alaska Income Distribution 
To analyze how different taxes and a dividend cut might affect Alaskans at different income 
levels, we divided Alaska households into ten groups, based on their per-capita incomes. We 
used U.S. Census Bureau data for 2014, the latest year available. Each group represents about 
29,000 households—but because households with higher incomes are on average smaller than 
those with low- and mid-range incomes, there are fewer people in the high-income percentiles 
(Figure II-1). 
Figure II-1 
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Income reported in the 2014 census data represents income earned in 2013. Households in the 
richest ten percent earned on average more than $200,000 that year, while those in the poorest 
ten percent earned less than $14,000 (Figure II-2). The top ten percent of households accounted 
for 21 percent of all personal income—only a little less than the bottom 50 percent of households 
combined (Figure II-3). Census income includes Permanent Fund dividend (PFD) payments for 
everyone in the household that received a dividend. It also includes cash public assistance, but 
not food stamps or any other non-cash benefits. Income distribution in Alaska has become more 
inequitable over the past 25 years, mirroring national trends. Still, income distribution in Alaska 
remains more equitable than in the nation as a whole, partly due to the PFD—which plays an 
important role in providing an income floor for the poorest Alaskans.   
 
Figure II-2 
  
 
Figure II-3 
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Table II-1 shows the census estimates for population, household size, and 2013 income for the 
ten household groups. The PFD was $900 in 2013, but has been larger in more recent years. For 
comparison, the last column of Table A-1 shows what 2013 per-capita income would have been, 
with a PFD of $2,000. 
 
Table II-1. 
Alaska Population, Persons per Household, and Per-capita Income 
by Per-capita Household Income Percentile 
 
 
Income percentile, households 
 
Population  
Average 
persons per 
household  
 
Per-capita 
income in 2013 
Per-capita 
income with 
$2,000 PFDa 
Lowest 10 percent of households      87,006  2.94  $    3,594  $    4,694  
10-20th percentile      89,660  3.03   10,465     11,565  
20-30th percentile      76,040  2.62    15,613     16,713  
30-40th percentile      84,404  2.84    20,412     21,512  
40-50th percentile      85,077  2.93    25,935     27,035  
50-60th percentile      78,178  2.66    32,818     33,918  
60-70th percentile      67,327  2.27    40,265     41,365  
70-80th percentile      63,722  2.18    51,154     52,254  
80-90th percentile      57,284  1.95    65,707     66,807  
Highest 10 percent of 
households 
     47,771  1.63  126,890   127,990  
     
All residents    736,471  2.51  $  33,578  
 
 $  34,678  
 
Non-Resident Workers and Visitors 
In addition to the 736 thousand Alaska residents the census bureau estimated for 2013, the 
Alaska Department of Labor reported 86 thousand non-residents were employed in Alaska and 
earned an average of nearly $28 thousand per worker. It should be noted that this figure 
understates the total number of non-resident workers, because it does not include federal 
government employees (including active-duty military personnel), or self-employed people 
(including commercial fishermen). 
 
Non-resident workers spend money in Alaska while they are here working. Most non-resident 
workers have temporary or permanent homes in Alaska and spend part of their income in the 
state, generating additional economic activity. In addition to non-resident workers, visitors to the 
state also spend money on many different items. The amount that non-resident workers and 
visitors might contribute to state revenues would vary by the type of revenue measure. Income 
taxes can be structured to include wages of non-resident workers in the tax base. Sales taxes 
collect money from visitors as well as non-resident workers. 
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Potential Revenues from Fiscal Options 
To analyze the effects of potential revenue options, we examined six broad-based fiscal 
measures. Five of those could be imposed at different rates to raise varying amounts of revenue. 
For the analysis, we examined hypothetical options of a similar scale: each measure was 
designed to raise $350-$400 million annually: 
 
• Two percent flat rate income tax 
• Ten percent federal income tax surcharge 
• $600 reduction in the annual PFD 
• Four percent sales tax, excluding food at home, health care, shelter, and education 
• Three percent sales tax, including food at home and shelter but excluding education and 
health care 
 
The sixth option, a potential state property tax, is more difficult to scale than the other options. 
We assumed that property taxes levied by local governments would be credited from the state 
tax, analogous to the way the state credits local governments in the existing state petroleum 
property tax—that makes it harder to scale than the other broad-based measures. The state of 
Alaska taxes petroleum property at a rate of 20 mils, or 2 percent. The highest local property tax 
rate in Alaska (in Valdez) is also currently at 20 mils. Consequently, we examined the potential 
effects of a 20 mil, or 2 percent, state property tax with a credit for taxes paid to local 
governments.  
 
To estimate potential revenue from income taxes, we relied on data from the Internal Revenue 
Service on the amount Alaska taxpayers at different income levels and filing status paid in 
federal individual income taxes in 2013. We assumed that wages of non-residents would be 
taxed at the same average tax rates as residents. 
 
Estimating revenue from sales taxes requires information on retail expenditures. The national 
Consumer Expenditure Survey provides detailed data on expenditures for residents of all states, 
including Alaska. Data on retail expenditures by non-residents is severely limited. We assumed 
that non-residents spend money in Alaska on living expenses in proportion to their share of total 
state wages. Using recent data on seasonal patterns of state alcohol taxes and local sales taxes, 
we estimated that non-residents bought 15 percent of commodities and 10 percent of services. It 
should be noted that these are generous estimates of non-resident expenditures. The true figures 
are unlikely to be higher, and could be somewhat lower. 
 
We estimated property tax revenues based on the “full and true value” of real and personal 
property as determined by the Alaska state assessor’s office. We adjusted the state tax base for 
property located outside the boundaries of taxing jurisdictions, based on census data. Almost all 
the value of potentially taxable property—except for a portion of the trans-Alaska pipeline 
(already taxed by the state)—is located in areas already subject to local property taxes. Property 
owned by non-resident households and businesses is included in the tax base. Estimates of the 
share of property tax revenues contributed by non-residents are highly uncertain, since 
information on non-resident property ownership is not systematically available. We estimate 
non-residents would contribute roughly 11% of property taxes. 
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Table II-2 shows the estimated revenues raised from the six potential measures, and the amounts 
residents and non-residents would pay. In estimating potential revenues from a reduced PFD, we 
assumed that one percent of dividends would be paid to people who filed for the dividend as 
residents but for various reasons were no longer Alaska residents by the end of the year. A 20-
mil property tax would collect $1.7 billion annually. After subtracting the amount local 
governments are collecting—which we assume would be credited from the state tax—the 
residual amount is $815 million, or about twice as much annual revenue as the other five 
measures would collect. 
 
Table II-2.  
Estimated Resident, Non-resident, and Total Annual Revenues Raised 
from Six Potential Revenue Measures 
 
 Total revenue raised ($ millions per year) 
Revenue measure Alaska 
residents 
Non-
residents 
Total, residents 
and non-
residents 
2 percent flat rate income tax  $366   $ 29   $396  
10 percent federal income tax surcharge  $338   $ 28   $366  
$600 cut in PFD  $380   $  4   $384  
4 percent sales tax excluding food at home, 
health care, shelter, and education 
 $318   $ 41   $359  
3 percent sales tax excluding education and 
health care 
 $388  $ 45  $433  
20 mil state property tax with local credit $ 716 $ 99 $815 
 
The federal government would also contribute some of the amounts shown in Table II-2 for 
Alaska residents and non-residents, in the form of reduced federal income taxes. The federal 
government would “pay” for a portion of revenues from reduced PFD payments, because the 
federal government taxes PFDs—and those federal income taxes would be reduced if PFDs were 
reduced. Alaska taxpayers itemizing deductions can also deduct property taxes, and either state 
income or sales taxes (but not both), from federal taxable income. Based on IRS data for the 
percentage of taxpayers itemizing deductions and tax rates at different income levels, we 
estimated that the reduced federal taxes would offset between 7 and 11 percent of tax revenues 
collected under the five tax options (Figure II-4). The federal share varies across the tax 
measures because higher-income taxpayers are more likely to itemize deductions—and therefore 
deduct the state tax from taxable income—and are also taxed at higher rates. Lower- and middle-
income taxpayers are less likely to itemize and so less likely to be able to deduct state taxes. The 
federal offset would be highest for an income tax based on a percentage of federal income taxes, 
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which collects a higher percentage as income increases—and lowest for sales taxes with fewer 
exemptions, which fall more heavily on lower-income taxpayers, if they have taxable income.  
 
For a reduced PFD, the federal share would be higher—about 16%. A smaller PFD would be a 
direct reduction in taxable income, so federal income taxes would be reduced for all those who 
have taxable income.  
 
 
Figure II-4 
 
 
 
Distribution of the Revenue Burden Among Alaska Households 
Figures II-5 and II-6 compare how each of the broad-based revenue measure would reduce per-
capita disposable income—income after taxes—for households with different levels of per-capita 
income, in dollars and in percentages. Because each revenue option would raise a different total 
amount of revenue, the numbers in the figures are normalized to show the loss in disposable 
income per $100 million in revenue raised. We assumed the entire amount of property taxes 
assessed on rental property would be passed on to renters. Although renters might not feel the 
full impact of the tax immediately, the higher costs to landlords would likely get built into new 
rental contracts as old contracts expire.  
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Figure II-5 
 
 
Figure II-6 
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• Reducing Permanent Fund dividends would cost the poorest households the most, in both 
dollars and in percentage of income.  
Reducing the PFD by $156 per person and diverting the revenue to state government would raise 
$100 million. But only the poorest households would actually lose the full amount. Most 
households would get a portion of the lost income back in reduced federal income taxes, but the 
poorest households might not have any income tax liability. The higher the household’s per-
capita income, the more the federal taxes would be reduced and the PFD loss offset. Per-person 
disposable income of the richest ten percent of households would fall on average $112.  
The dollar losses for the poorest households amount to 3.3 percent of their per-person disposable 
income—compared with 0.1 percent for the wealthiest households. 
 
• The wealthiest households would pay five to twelve times as much in sales taxes as the 
poorest—but the poorest would lose significantly more as a percentage of their income. 
For a sales tax that raised $100 million in revenue, the wealthiest ten percent of households 
would pay about $250 to $300 per person and the poorest about $25 to $50 per person, 
depending on whether it was the 3% tax including food and shelter or the 4% tax excluding food 
and shelter.  
Those dollar amounts represent about 0.2 percent of the per-capita disposable income of the 
wealthiest households, but 0.5 percent to 1 percent of the poorest.  
The 3% sales tax option has a lower rate but a broader base than the 4% option. The two types of 
expenditures excluded in the 4% tax—food at home and shelter—vary much less with income 
than do expenditures for other goods and services. In fact, because the shelter category includes 
rent but excludes payments for owner-occupied housing—and higher income households are 
much more likely to own their homes—there is little variation in shelter expenditures across the 
different income percentiles. So while both sales-tax options would be regressive, the one 
including food and shelter is more regressive. Also, non-residents purchase less food at home 
and shelter, relative to residents, than they purchase other potentially taxable goods and services. 
 
• A state property tax would also cost the wealthiest households about five times more in dollars 
than the poorest households—but again, the poorest would pay a bigger percentage. 
A 2% state property tax that raised $100 million would cost the wealthiest households about 
$230 per person and the poorest about $50. That translates into about 0.2 percent of per capita 
income for the wealthiest household and 1 percent for the poorest—making it as regressive as the 
sales tax that includes food and shelter.  
Property taxes paid by businesses would also almost certainly be passed on to customers. The 
only exception would likely be natural resource exports such as fish and minerals, where prices 
are set by world markets, not Alaska supply and demand. To assess the distribution of these 
business property taxes among Alaska households, we assumed that the property tax would add 
to the cost of living in proportion to non-shelter expenditures. 
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 • The income tax options would cost the wealthiest households 70 to 160 times as much in 
dollars as the poorest, which have very little income to tax. These are the only options that would 
cost the wealthiest households a higher percentage of their incomes. 
A 2% flat-rate income tax that raised $100 million would cost the wealthiest households about 
$470 per person, and a 10% federal income tax surcharge about $600 per person. The 2 percent 
flat-rate income tax is progressive at lower income scales, due to the fixed exemptions and 
deductions for the tax base: federal taxable income. The 10 percent income tax surcharge is more 
progressive, following the progressive structure of the federal income tax. Even with the 
progressive rates, the income tax surcharge would reduce per-capita disposable income of the 
richest ten percent of households by about 0.5 percent per $100 million raised. 
 
Effects of Broad-Based Revenue Measures on Household Expenditures 
All the fiscal options would have some adverse effect on the economy, because they would 
reduce disposable income. As disposable income falls, households spend less on goods and 
services. But the amount a tax increase or spending cut changes spending depends on how 
households react to the change in their economic circumstances, and how markets respond to the 
changes in household behavior. Because we do not know how households and markets will react, 
our estimates of economic impacts are uncertain. We addressed the uncertainty by analyzing two 
scenarios, each based on a set of assumptions about how taxes and dividend cuts affect 
household purchasing power (disposable income), and about how changes in disposable income 
affect spending. The scenarios are based on two data sources: the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
IMPLAN input-output model. 
 
We used the IMPLAN input-output model to estimate the indirect (multiplier) effects of changes 
in spending, as discussed more in Chapter III. The model has a set of embedded assumptions 
about income and spending. IMPLAN cannot distinguish income of residents from that of non-
resident workers, nor does it distinguish spending of residents and visitors. We used the census 
income data to represent the distribution of the effects of revenue measures.  
 
IMPLAN also assumes that all changes in the economy are proportional to changes in spending. 
This means that the model cannot account for people adjusting their household spending patterns 
when their incomes change; for example, people might eat more meals at home rather than going 
out. Consequently, estimates of expenditure changes from IMPLAN are likely to be larger than 
what will actually take place. IMPLAN also includes non-cash benefits households receive from 
employers and government, such as employer-provided health insurance and food stamps. The 
census data include only cash income. Non-cash benefits do increase household purchasing 
power and contribute to the economy, so leaving them out could potentially underestimate 
economic impacts. Also, the census questionnaire does not have an entry for income of children 
under 16. It is not possible to determine, therefore, whether children’s PFD payments are 
counted in household income—so the income reported in the census may be somewhat 
understated. 
 
Because it is not possible to reconcile the two data sources, we estimated two sets of impacts, 
based on the assumptions tied to the different data sources. Since the assumptions embedded in 
the IMPLAN model generally result in higher estimated impacts, we call the estimates based on 
IMPLAN expenditure changes the “high” scenario, and the estimates based on census data the 
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“low” scenario. Table II-3 summarizes the assumptions about income and spending for the low 
and high scenarios. We present the projected expenditure changes under the six revenue 
measures in this chapter. Chapter III, which discusses economic impacts using the IMPLAN 
model, also discusses the expenditure effects in the high scenario. 
Table II-3. 
Summary of Assumptions About Income and Spending for Two Methods of Estimating 
Economic Impacts of Spending Cuts and Revenue Measures 
Assumption High Low 
Income driving spending patterns includes   
 Wages and salaries x x 
 Proprietors' income x x 
 Rent, interest, and dividends x x 
 Employer-paid job benefits x  
 In-kind assistance such as food stamps x  
 Rent homeowners avoid by owning their dwellings x  
Spending patterns driving economic impacts   
 Spending changes in proportion to income x  
 Spending patterns differ between residents and non-residents  x 
 Resident households adjust spending patterns with income  x 
 Loan payments change in proportion to income x  
 Loan payments assumed fixed in short term  x 
 Change in housing prices considered part of spending change x  
 Change in housing prices ignored (benefits cancel out costs)  x 
 
Figure II-7 summarizes the amount each of the six fiscal options would reduce household 
expenditures, per thousand dollars of revenue raised, based on the low- and high-scenario 
assumptions. Appendixes A and C have detailed explanations of our methods.  
 
Income taxes would have the least effect on expenditures—reductions in the range of $515 to 
$790 per thousand dollars of revenue raised, and the PFD cut would have the largest—about 
$580 in the low scenario and $930 in the high. This difference in the effects of income taxes and 
PFD cuts is directly related to their distribution. A cut in the PFD would reduce disposable 
income much more for lower-income households than the income tax would—and lower-income 
households spend a much bigger share of their income than higher-income households do.  
 
The low scenario estimates that the two sales-tax options would reduce household spending by 
about $515 to $530 per thousand dollars of revenue raised, while the high scenario puts the 
reduction in the range of $850. Reduced spending under the property tax is estimated to be very 
similar—$519 under the low scenario and $866 under the high. 
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Figure II-7 
 
 
Increases in Excise Taxes on Alcohol, Tobacco, and Petroleum Fuels 
In addition to the six broad-based revenue measures discussed above, we also considered 
potential revenues from and effects on households and the economy of potential increases in 
excise taxes. Alaska already taxes petroleum fuels, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products. 
The state could raise additional revenue by increasing the tax rates on these products. For the 
most part, increased excise taxes would have similar effects on the economy per dollar of 
revenue raised as general sales taxes. But the distribution of the effects on household disposable 
income would be different. 
 
Alaska taxes different types of petroleum fuel at different rates. Motor fuels are taxed at a rate of 
$0.0895 per gallon, marine fuels at $0.05 per gallon, aviation gasoline at $0.047 and jet fuel at 
$0.032 per gallon. The $0.0895 per gallon highway rate includes a surcharge of $0.95 cents per 
gallon, effective July 1, 2015. Commercial enterprises pay a substantial portion of motor fuel 
taxes.  
 
In fiscal year 2015, the state collected $42 million from fuel taxes, and will likely collect $45 
million in 2016, with the surcharge in effect. Even with the surcharge, Alaska fuel taxes are the 
lowest in the nation. According to data from the American Petroleum Institute, a trade 
organization, Alaska would have to increase its fuel taxes by about 17.5 cents per gallon to bring 
its fuel tax rates to the national average. Such an increase would provide an estimated $87 
million per year of additional revenue. 
 
The justification often made for levying excise taxes on transportation fuels is that it is a user fee 
to allow the state to recover its cost of operating, maintaining, and upgrading state highways, 
harbors, and airports. The federal gasoline tax is specifically earmarked for the Highway Trust 
Fund, which pays for highway and other surface transportation infrastructure. In Alaska, the 
current state budget for the unit of the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities that 
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deals with transportation facilities exceeds $200 million. Even if Alaska raised fuel taxes to the 
national average rates, the total fuel taxes paid of $133 million would still fall far short of what it 
actually costs to maintain Alaska’s transportation infrastructure, let alone the state’s share of new 
highway construction and port expansion. To cover the state’s actual share of the costs of 
maintaining and improving Alaska’s transportation infrastructure, the motor fuels tax would have 
to increase by a factor of five.  
Although gasoline taxes are considered regressive nationally, Alaska appears to be different. 
Data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey suggest that fuel expenditures are roughly 
proportional to per-capita household income, although fuel purchases vary greatly among 
households. In Alaska, higher-income households are more likely to own and use recreational 
vehicles, boats, and airplanes, as well as to drive less fuel-efficient vehicles. Rural Alaska 
households with lower incomes use gasoline for snowmachines, boats, and all-terrain vehicles, 
but generally use less fuel than urban households. So in Alaska at least, it does not appear that 
gasoline taxes would place a higher burden on low-income households. Given the pattern of fuel 
use, the low current state tax rates, and the cost of maintaining the state’s transportation 
infrastructure, raising motor fuel taxes could be a reasonable measure to increase revenues.   
Current tax rates on alcohol are based on a rate of $0.10 per drink, which translates to $1.07 per 
gallon for beer, $2.50 per gallon for wine, and $12.80 per gallon for hard liquor. Small breweries 
get a substantial tax reduction. The state alcohol tax raises about $38 million per year, of which 
$19 million comes from liquor sales, $6 million from wine, and $13 million from beer. 
Raising the alcohol tax rate to $0.25 per drink would likely bring in about $55 million more 
revenue. Although no solid data exist for Alaska, the tax is presumed to be quite regressive, as it 
seems unreasonable to expect that total alcohol consumption would rise proportionately as 
income rises. That means the burden of the additional tax would fall more heavily on lower- 
income households. On the other hand, consumer expenditure survey data for Alaska show that 
higher-income households spend a bigger share of their income on alcohol than lower-income 
households do. This apparent contradiction may be related to how higher income households buy 
alcohol. More affluent households would be much more likely to buy wine and beer in 
restaurants, for example, where the retail price per drink is much higher than in liquor stores. 
This finding suggests that the state could avoid imposing an undue burden on lower-income 
households by considering changing the alcohol tax from a constant amount per unit of alcohol 
to an “ad valorem” tax—that is, a tax based on a constant percentage of the retail alcohol price. 
Alaska taxes tobacco at a rate based on a tax of $2.00 per pack of cigarettes. Tobacco taxes 
brought in $65 million in 2015. The amount collected has been declining in recent years. Only 
about one in five Alaska households in the Consumer Expenditure Survey reported spending any 
money on tobacco products, and the amount those households do spend on tobacco is not 
correlated with income. The downward trend of tax collections is partly due to the decline in 
tobacco use, but is also likely related to more people buying through the Internet and using other 
means to avoid paying Alaska’s relatively high tax. Raising tobacco taxes would only increase 
the incentive for tobacco users to find ways to avoid the tax, and therefore would not necessarily 
increase state revenues. This problem, coupled with the fact that tobacco taxes are highly 
regressive, suggests that increased tobacco taxes are not a promising strategy for reducing the 
state budget deficit. 
 
III-1 
 
III. SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FISCAL OPTIONS 
In this chapter we discuss our estimates of the short-run economic impacts of various fiscal 
options on income and jobs.  Appendix D provides technical details of the methods and results.   
 
As we noted in Chapter II, each of the options would raise a different amount of total revenue—
so to compare across options, we show the estimated short-run economic impacts per $100 of 
revenue collected. To estimate the total economic impacts of a specific option, the impacts 
reported here can be scaled up or down. For example, the estimated economic impacts of an 
income tax that raised $200 million in new revenues would be twice those shown in this chapter. 
 
Overview of Methodology 
To compare the short-run economic impacts of different fiscal options, we used a standard 
economic technique known as economic impact modeling and a commonly used model known 
as IMPLAN.  As illustrated in Figure III-1, we began by estimating the “direct” impacts on 
income and jobs of the various fiscal options: cuts in state spending, a cut in the Permanent Fund 
dividend, and several kinds of taxes. For the tax and dividend-cut options, these direct effects 
result from the initial changes in payments to and income of Alaska households and businesses 
when they pay new taxes or get smaller dividends. The corresponding direct impacts from state 
spending cuts are changes in public sector jobs and income, and changes in private jobs and 
income that follow when the state reduces payments to private businesses. 
 
Next we estimated how these direct impacts would affect spending by businesses and 
households.  These changes in spending generate additional, or “multiplier,” impacts on income 
and jobs, as the effects of less spending ripple through the economy. 
 
Figure III-1 
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As shown on the right side of Figure III-1, five types of assumptions are particularly important 
for our analysis of short-run economic impacts: 
 
• For the spending cut options, how spending is cut, which affects both the absolute and 
relative direct impacts of the cuts on private sector and public sector income and jobs. 
 
• For the tax options, the effective tax rates paid by Alaskans of different income groups, 
and the share of taxes paid by non-residents. 
 
• The marginal federal tax rates of Alaskans experiencing direct income impacts. These 
rates affect how much direct income impacts are partially offset by reduced federal taxes. 
 
• The marginal savings rates of Alaskans experiencing direct income impacts: that means 
the extent to which they would respond to reduced income by reducing their savings or 
reducing their spending.  These marginal savings rates, which directly drive our estimates 
of multiplier impacts, are the most difficult to estimate and the greatest source of 
uncertainty in our estimates of short-run economic impacts. 
 
• The numerous assumptions embedded in the IMPLAN model about the extent to which 
payments to households and businesses in different sectors result in further payments to 
households and businesses in different sectors, all of which cumulatively result in the 
estimated multiplier impacts on income and jobs.    
 
As discussed in Chapter II, we analyzed two scenarios of how various fiscal options might affect 
household spending, based on different assumptions estimated from different data sources. We 
refer to these as the “high” scenario (based on assumptions embedded in the IMPLAN model) 
and the “low” scenario (based on assumptions estimated from the U.S. census income data).  The 
high-scenario assumptions generally result in higher estimated impacts on Alaska household 
spending—and correspondingly higher multiplier economic impacts—than the low-scenario 
assumptions.  In the following sections, we first discuss the estimated impacts under the high 
scenario and then the estimated impacts under the low scenario. 
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High-Scenario Estimates of Short-Run Economic Impacts  
Table III-1 summarizes our estimates of the short-run economic impacts of 11 fiscal options per 
$100 million of deficit reduction, under the high-scenario expenditure impact assumptions.  
Below we discuss the estimated direct, multiplier, and total effects on income, and effects on 
employment.   
 
Note first, however, that the “saving less” option has no short-run economic impacts:  saving less 
of the state’s annual Permanent Fund earnings would not result in any short-term changes in 
income or employment. This option would involve using some of the earnings the state currently 
saves, either by adding them to the fund principal—to protect it from inflation—or to the 
earnings reserve.   
 
Table III-1 
Direct 
earned
Direct 
other
Multi-
plier Total Direct
Multi-
plier Total
Spending cut: workers 95 43 138 962 715 1677
Spending cut: broad-based 67 48 115 504 754 1260
Spending cut: capital 42 22 64 506 425 931
Spending cut: pay 100 43 143 0 727 727
Income tax: progressive 93 45 138 0 786 786
Income tax: flat rate 93 46 138 0 798 798
Sales tax: more exclusions 89 44 133 0 775 775
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 90 45 134 0 788 788
Property tax 88 44 132 0 773 773
Dividend cut 99 50 149 0 892 892
Saving less 0 0
Estimated Short-Run Economic Impacts of Selected Fiscal Options
Per $100 Million of Deficit Reduction (High Scenario)
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
 
 
Direct Income Impacts 
We divide direct income impacts into two types.  Direct earned income impacts result when 
public or private sector workers have reduced earnings as a direct result of cuts in government 
spending.  Direct other income impacts result from reductions in household disposable income, 
either from paying state taxes or getting smaller dividend payments. 
 
The state could structure spending cuts in many ways; we analyzed four generic options to show 
the different effects of cutting spending in different ways. Table III-1 illustrates the potential 
range of direct impacts on earned income from different kinds of spending cuts. 
  
Direct Earned Income Impacts 
• The direct earned income impacts would be largest if the state cut workers’ pay or eliminated 
jobs, and could be significantly less under broad-based cuts or cuts in the capital budget.  
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If a $100 million spending cut were made entirely to the pay of state workers, the direct earned 
income impact would be $100 million. If a $100 million spending cut were made by cutting state 
government jobs, then the direct earned income impact would be slightly less ($95 million), 
because some of the cut would be in other costs of state workers, such as costs of office space.  
 
If spending cuts were broad-based—that is, spread throughout the state budget—or in the capital 
budget, the direct earned income impact might be significantly lower. That’s because relatively 
less of the cuts would be in payments to state or contractor workers, and relatively more would 
be in payments for other costs—such as energy, supplies, and construction materials.  Note that 
the direct earned income impact we estimate for broad-based spending cuts ($67 million) and 
capital spending cuts ($42 million) reflect the generic scenarios we analyzed:  the impacts might 
differ for any actual broad-based or capital-budget spending cuts. 
 
Direct Other Income Impacts 
• The direct other income impact of a dividend cut would be larger than that of taxes, because 
non-residents would pay part of the taxes. 
The direct other income impacts assumed for the tax and dividend cuts reflect our estimates from 
Chapter II (Figure II-4) of the share of taxes and dividend cuts non-residents would pay. The 
estimated non-resident share is in the range of 7% to 11% for various taxes—meaning the direct 
other income impact would vary between 88% and 93%.  
 
In estimating income effects of a cut in Permanent Fund dividends, we assumed that non-
residents collect about one percent of dividends every year, because they were residents at the 
time they applied but for various reasons later left the state. So the directed other income impact 
of a $100 million cut in dividend payments would be $99 million, rather than $100 million. 
 
In general, the fact that non-residents would pay part of sales, property, and income taxes means 
that not only the direct income and job impacts but also the resulting multiplier income and job 
impacts would be lower for the tax options than for the dividend-cut option—under which 
Alaska residents would experience almost the entire loss of income. 
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Multiplier and Total Income Impacts 
When the incomes of households and businesses are directly affected, they in turn reduce their 
spending—which creates additional, broader effects on income: these are multiplier effects. 
Total income impacts are the sum of direct and multiplier impacts. In general, the larger the 
direct effect on income, the larger the multiplier effect. 
• The estimated total income impacts are largest for the dividend-cut option—$149 million in 
lost income for a $100 million cut in dividends.  
As Table III-1 shows, the direct effects on income are virtually the same for the dividend-cut 
option and the spending-cut option that reduces workers’ pay by $100 million. But the total 
estimated income impact of reduced workers’ pay is somewhat lower—$143 million. That’s 
because a higher share of dividend cuts would be from lower-income households, for whom the 
effects on spending would be greater—because they spend more of their incomes. 
• The total income impacts of the tax options are in the range of $135 million for $100 million in 
revenue raised. Because taxes would be partly paid by non-residents, they wouldn’t directly 
reduce Alaskans’ incomes by as much as dividend cuts.  
• Total effects on income are lowest for broad-based spending cuts or cuts in capital spending. 
Unlike the dividend-cut and reduced-pay options, only part of broad-based or capital spending 
cuts would be direct reductions in household incomes. This doesn’t mean their income effects 
would be small or insignificant; it only means they wouldn’t be as large as for other options.  
 
Estimating Multiplier Effects 
How did we estimate the multiplier effects on income?  Our estimates are driven by our 
assumptions about how direct income impacts reduce household spending, as well as by the 
numerous IMPLAN model assumptions about the allocation of household and business 
expenditures among different industries and households.  These combined assumptions result in 
the implicit “income multipliers” for the high scenario, shown in Table III-2.  
 
Table III-2. 
Ratio of
multiplier income impacts
to direct income impacts
Ratio of
total income impacts
to direct income impacts
Spending cut: workers 0.45 1.45
Spending cut: broad-based 0.71 1.71
Spending cut: capital 0.53 1.53
Spending cut: pay 0.43 1.43
Income tax: progressive 0.49 1.49
Income tax: flat rate 0.49 1.49
Sales tax: more exclusions 0.50 1.50
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 0.50 1.50
Property tax 0.50 1.50
Dividend cut 0.50 1.50
Implicit Income Multipliers for Fiscal Options ("High Scenario")
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The implicit income multipliers are almost the same for the tax and dividend-cut options (about 
0.50), reflecting our assumption that direct income impacts under those options would have 
proportionally similar impacts on expenditures.   
 
By contrast, the implicit income multipliers for the four spending cut options vary.  For the 
options that would eliminate state jobs or cut state workers’ pay, the variation in part reflects 
differences in the assumed income distribution of state workers who would be affected by these 
options, and the broader income distribution of Alaska households that would be affected by the 
tax and dividend cut options.  For the broad-based and capital-budget spending cut options, the 
variation is in part because some of the multiplier impacts would be caused by changes in 
spending by businesses directly affected by changes in state spending. 
 
Job Impacts 
Direct Job Impacts 
As shown in the top three rows of Table III-1, only three of the spending cut options—
eliminating state jobs, making broad-based cuts, and cutting the capital budget—would have 
direct job impacts.  The direct impacts of the other options are reductions in income, but not job 
losses.   
• The direct job impacts are highest—960 jobs —for cutting $100 million solely through job cuts. 
Direct losses under broad-based cuts and capital-budget cuts would be roughly half that size. 
 
Multiplier and Total Job Losses 
Only three of the fiscal options would cause direct job losses, but all the options would cause 
indirect, multiplier job losses, as the effects of less income moved through the economy.  
• Total job losses would be largest under the option of cutting spending just through job cuts—
nearly 1,700 jobs lost for $100 million in state spending cuts. 
• Total job losses under the dividend-cut option would be larger than under any of the tax 
options—nearly 900 jobs for $100 million in dividend cuts. 
Total job losses under any of the tax options would be in the range of about 780 jobs per $100 
million of revenue raised. Broad-based spending cuts would cost the economy an estimated 
1,260 jobs per $100 million in cuts, and cuts in the capital budget 930 jobs.     
 
Estimating Job-Loss Multiplier Effects 
The estimated multiplier job impacts reflect IMPLAN model assumptions about the full-time-
equivalent (FTE) multiplier job impacts resulting from multiplier income impacts (Table III-3).  
In general, the ratio of multiplier job impacts to multiplier income impacts is similar across fiscal 
options, and ranges from 16 to 19 FTE multiplier job impacts per million dollars of multiplier 
income impacts (the differences result from differences in the relative shares of different 
industries in changes in estimated spending flows).    
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Table III-3 
Option
Ratio of multiplier job impacts to 
multiplier income impacts 
Spending cut: workers 16.7
Spending cut: broad-based 15.8
Spending cut: capital 19.1
Spending cut: pay 16.8
Income tax: progressive 17.3
Income tax: flat rate 17.5
Sales tax: more exclusions 17.6
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 17.7
Property tax 17.6
Dividend cut 17.9
Multiplier FTE Job Impacts 
per Million Dollars of Muliplier Income Impacts
 
 
 
Low-Scenario Estimates of Short-Run Economic Impacts 
Table III-4 summarizes our estimates of the short-run economic impacts of fiscal options under 
the low-scenario assumptions.  These estimates differ from those under the high scenario because 
they are based on different assumptions, estimated from a different data source. The low scenario 
assumes that households wouldn’t reduce their spending as much if their incomes were reduced, 
but rather save less or borrow more. As a result, the estimated multiplier impacts are about one-
third smaller than those we just discussed for the high scenario. 
 
Table III-4 
Direct 
earned
Direct 
other
Multi-
plier Total Direct
Multi-
plier Total
Spending cut: workers 95 27 122 962 452 1414
Spending cut: broad-based 67 30 98 504 476 980
Spending cut: capital 42 14 56 506 269 775
Spending cut: pay 100 27 127 459 459
Income tax: progressive 93 31 124 544 544
Income tax: flat rate 93 30 122 517 517
Sales tax: more exclusions 89 27 116 477 477
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 90 27 117 482 482
Property tax 88 26 114 463 463
Dividend cut 99 31 130 558 558
Saving less 0 0
Estimated Short-Run Economic Impacts of Selected Fiscal Options
Per $100 Million of Deficit Reduction (Low Scenario)
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
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Table III-5 shows the ratio of the impacts projected for the low scenario in Table III-4 to the 
impacts projected for the high-scenario estimates, shown in Table III-1. The low-scenario 
multiplier impacts range from 60% to 69% of the high-scenario multiplier impacts.  The low-
scenario total impacts range from 85% to 90% for income and between 60% and 84% for jobs. 
   
Table III-5 
Direct 
earned
Direct 
other
Multi-
plier Total Direct
Multi-
plier Total
Spending cut: workers 1.00 0.63 0.89 1.00 0.63 0.84
Spending cut: broad-based 1.00 0.63 0.85 1.00 0.63 0.78
Spending cut: capital 1.00 0.63 0.87 1.00 0.63 0.83
Spending cut: pay 1.00 0.63 0.89 0.63 0.63
Income tax: progressive 1.00 0.69 0.90 0.69 0.69
Income tax: flat rate 1.00 0.65 0.88 0.65 0.65
Sales tax: more exclusions 1.00 0.61 0.87 0.61 0.61
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 1.00 0.61 0.87 0.61 0.61
Property tax 1.00 0.60 0.87 0.60 0.60
Dividend cut 1.00 0.62 0.87 0.62 0.62
Ratio of Low Scenario to High Scenario Estimates of Short-Run Economic Impacts of 
Selected Fiscal Options
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
 
  
 
Table III-6 summarizes the total short-run economic impacts estimated for the two scenarios. 
The relative ranking of impacts is almost the same, except that rankings for employment impacts 
shift slightly between some of the income and sale tax options.   
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Table III-6 
Low scenario High scenario Low scenario High scenario
Spending cut: workers 122 138 1414 1677
Spending cut: broad-based 98 115 980 1260
Spending cut: capital 56 64 775 931
Spending cut: pay 127 143 459 727
Income tax: progressive 124 138 544 786
Income tax: flat rate 122 138 517 798
Sales tax: more exclusions 116 133 477 775
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 117 134 482 788
Property tax 114 132 463 773
Dividend cut 130 149 558 892
Saving less 0 0 0 0
Estimated Total Short-Run Economic Impacts of Selected Options for Reducing the Deficit by $100 Million:
Low and High Scenarios
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
 
 
Which estimates of economic impacts are “better”?  We don’t know, because we don’t have 
enough data about the extent to which Alaska households would react to reductions in their 
incomes by reducing spending or reducing their savings.  Both sets of estimates are reasonable.  
Taken together, they suggest a range within which actual economic impacts would likely fall. 
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Short-Run Economic Impacts of Combinations of Options 
Up to this point, we’ve discussed our estimates of potential impacts of individual fiscal options, 
to illustrate the effects of specific changes. But in reality, it is more likely the state will reduce 
the deficit through some combination of fiscal options. The economic impacts of any given 
combination of options can be calculated as the economic impacts of the individual options, 
weighted by their share in the total deficit reduction.   
 
Table III-7 shows the economic impacts of selected hypothetical combinations of fiscal options, 
per $100 million of deficit reduction.  Note that the more the combination of options includes 
those with lower economic impacts (particularly the “saving less” option), the lower the 
economic impact of the combination. 
 
Table III-7 
Option
Four 
options
Spending cut: workers
Spending cut: broad-based 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Spending cut: capital
Spending cut: pay
Income tax: progressive 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Income tax: flat rate
Sales tax: more exclusions
Sales tax: fewer exclusions
Property tax
Dividend cut 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Saving less 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Total income impact
(millions of $ of income)
Low scenario 111 114 127 49 65 62 117 76 74 85 88
High scenario 127 132 143 58 74 69 134 88 84 96 101
Total jobs impact
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
Low scenario 762 769 551 490 279 272 694 513 508 367 521
High scenario 1023 1076 839 630 446 393 980 717 682 560 735
Examples of Ranges of Estimated Economic Impacts Per $100 Million of Deficit Reduction
Resulting from Selected Potential Combinations of Fiscal Options
Two options Three options
Range of 
estimated 
impacts
Examples
of
potential
combinations
of
options
 
 
Note: Some of those who commented on the draft of this report asked a reasonable question: if 
cutting Permanent Fund dividends would potentially cost the economy hundreds of jobs, why 
didn’t Alaska see a substantial number of new jobs created in recent years, when the size of 
dividends increased sharply? The answer is that we likely would have seen the economy expand, 
if other changes—including significant losses in federal spending and losses in the oil industry— 
hadn’t been costing the state jobs. At any given time, many factors are affecting the state 
economy. Positive effects of one factor may be offsetting negative effects of others. That makes 
it hard to see the effects of both kinds of factors—but it doesn’t mean they aren’t happening. 
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Limitations of Comparative Short-Run Economic Impact Estimates 
The input-output modeling approach we used to estimate short-run economic impacts is the best 
available technique for estimating how a change in spending or income attributable to a 
particular industry or government policy ripples through the economy as a result of further 
changes in spending flows between industries and households.   
 
But our economic-impact estimates should be considered approximate rather than precise 
measures of the actual impacts that each fiscal option might have, for a number of reasons: 
 
• The spending-cut assumptions are based on generic assumptions about how state spending cuts 
would be made; actual spending cuts might differ significantly. 
 
• The estimates do not account for potential behavioral adjustments in spending, wage rates, 
prices, or migration to and from Alaska. The best way to interpret our estimates is as the impacts 
resulting from less money circulating in the economy, but not those that might result from people 
changing their behavior if their economic circumstances changed.  
 
• The estimates do not include other potential short-term and longer-term economic impacts not 
directly caused by changes in spending flows.  These might include, for example, the economic 
impacts over time of reductions in state services due to spending cuts, or how investment and 
growth in different Alaska industries might be affected by new taxes over time.  As we discuss in 
Chapter VI, these other economic impacts of fiscal options might be as important or more 
important than the short-run economic impacts we estimated—but analyzing them was well 
beyond the scope of what we could do for this study. 
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IV. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN IMPACTS OF FISCAL OPTIONS 
Regional Differences in Revenue Impacts 
There are significant regional differences in income distribution in Alaska.  Figure IV-1 (on the 
following page) shows one of many potential measures of regional income distribution: the share 
of exemptions (a rough measure of population) Alaskans claimed on 2013 federal income tax 
returns, for five ranges of adjusted gross income reported on the return.  The share of exemptions 
for returns with less than $25,000 in adjusted gross income ranged from as high as 55% for the 
Kusilvak (formerly Wade Hampton) census area to as low as 17% for the Juneau City and 
Borough, with an Alaska average of 22%.   
 
By contrast, the share of exemptions accounted for by returns with more than $75,000 in 
adjusted gross income was 48% for the Juneau City and Borough but only 9% for the Kusilvak 
census area, with an Alaska average of 39%.  Clearly, there would be significant differences in 
how these two census areas would be affected by dividend cuts and income taxes. 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the revenue impacts of the tax and dividend-cut fiscal options vary 
significantly by income groups.  We would expect corresponding variation in revenue impacts by 
region—lower-income regions are likely to be affected relatively more by dividend cuts and 
sales taxes, which have relatively greater effects on lower-income groups.  Higher-income 
regions are likely to be affected relatively more by income taxes, which have relatively greater 
effects on higher-income groups. 
 
Regional Differences in Employment Impacts 
There are also significant regional differences around Alaska in what shares different industries 
make up of employment and wage and salary income.  As shown in Figure IV-2, in 2014 the 
share of state government jobs in total wage and salary earnings was 28% in Juneau but less than 
1% in the North Slope Borough.  Clearly, Juneau would be affected far more than the North 
Slope Borough by cuts in state government jobs or pay. 
 
As shown in Figure IV-3, in 2014 the share of local government jobs in total wage and salary 
earnings was 60% in the Wade Hampton (now Kusilvak) census area, but only 4% in the Denali 
Borough.  Clearly, the Wade Hampton census area would be affected far more than the Denali 
Borough by cuts in revenue sharing, K-12 education funding, or other kinds of state spending 
that help pay for local government. 
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Figure IV-1 
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Figure IV-2 
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V.  TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF REDUCING THE DEFICIT 
 
In this chapter we discuss total potential short-run impacts on the economy of reducing the 
deficit, and how those impacts might be affected by how fast the deficit is reduced.   
 
Table V-1 shows the estimated total impacts of reducing the deficit by specific amounts, using 
selected potential combinations of fiscal options. We calculated these estimates by extrapolating 
from the estimates in Table III-7 in Chapter III, of the impacts of reducing the deficit by $100 
million using these combinations. Note that we are not arguing for or against the need to reduce 
the deficit by any of these amounts or in any ways. Our purpose is simply to illustrate what the 
estimated impacts would by of reducing the deficit by these amounts, in these ways. 
 
Table V-1. 
Four 
options
Spending cut: broad-based 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Income tax: progressive 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Dividend cut 50% 50% 0% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Saving less 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Income:  Low scenario 111 116 129 49 67 62 119 77 74 86 89
Income:  High scenario 127 132 143 58 74 69 134 88 84 96 101
Jobs:  Low scenario 765 806 578 496 309 269 716 537 510 386 537
Jobs:  High scenario 1,023 1,076 839 630 446 393 980 717 682 560 735
Income:  Low scenario 555 580 643 246 334 309 593 387 370 429 445
Income:  High scenario 633 660 717 288 372 345 670 440 422 478 503
Jobs:  Low scenario 3,826 4,029 2,892 2,481 1,547 1,345 3,582 2,686 2,551 1,928 2,687
Jobs:  High scenario 5,116 5,380 4,196 3,150 2,230 1,966 4,898 3,587 3,411 2,798 3,673
Income:  Low scenario 1,110 1,160 1,286 492 668 618 1,185 773 740 858 889
Income:  High scenario 1,265 1,320 1,434 576 745 690 1,340 880 844 956 1,005
Jobs:  Low scenario 7,652 8,057 5,784 4,963 3,094 2,690 7,164 5,371 5,102 3,856 5,373
Jobs:  High scenario 10,232 10,761 8,393 6,300 4,461 3,932 9,795 7,174 6,821 5,595 7,346
Income:  Low scenario 1,665 1,740 1,930 738 1,002 927 1,778 1,160 1,110 1,286 1,334
Income:  High scenario 1,898 1,981 2,152 864 1,117 1,035 2,010 1,320 1,265 1,434 1,508
Jobs:  Low scenario 11,479 12,086 8,676 7,444 4,641 4,034 10,747 8,057 7,652 5,784 8,060
Jobs:  High scenario 15,348 16,141 12,589 9,450 6,691 5,898 14,693 10,761 10,232 8,393 11,019
Income:  Low scenario 2,220 2,320 2,573 984 1,337 1,236 2,371 1,547 1,480 1,715 1,778
Income:  High scenario 2,531 2,641 2,869 1,152 1,489 1,379 2,680 1,761 1,687 1,913 2,010
Jobs:  Low scenario 15,305 16,114 11,568 9,926 6,188 5,379 14,329 10,743 10,203 7,712 10,747
Jobs:  High scenario 20,464 21,521 16,785 12,600 8,921 7,864 19,590 14,348 13,643 11,190 14,693
Income:  Low scenario             2,964 1,933 1,850 2,144 2,223
Income:  High scenario             3,350 2,201 2,109 2,391 2,513
Jobs:  Low scenario             17,911 13,428 12,754 9,640 13,433
Jobs:  High scenario             24,488 17,934 17,053 13,988 18,366
Income:  Low scenario             3,556 2,320 2,220 2,573 2,667
Income:  High scenario             4,020 2,641 2,531 2,869 3,015
Jobs:  Low scenario             21,493 16,114 15,305 11,568 16,120
Jobs:  High scenario             29,385 21,521 20,464 16,785 22,039
Estimated Impacts of Reducing the Deficit by Selected Total Amounts Using Different Potential Combinations of Fiscal Options
Note:  Units for income impacts are millions of dollars.  Units for job impacts are FTE jobs.  Table omits combination of options and total deficit 
reduction which would require reductions of more than $1 billion from any single option.  Table calculated by extrapolating from the estimated 
impacts of reducing the deficit by $100 million shown in Table III-7.
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $3.0 billion
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $2.5 billion
Two options Three options
Combinations
of fiscal
options
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $100 million
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $500 million
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $1.0 billion
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $1.5 billion
Estimated impacts 
of reducing defcit 
by $2.0 billion
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Table V-2 shows several measures of the scale of Alaska jobs and income against which we can 
compare the scale of potential short-run economic impacts of reducing the deficit.  We believe 
that the largest measures of income and employment (total personal income and total full-time 
and part-time employment) are most appropriate for thinking about the relative income and job 
impacts of reducing the deficit.  
 
Table V-2. 
Total personal income 39,793
Total earnings by place of work 30,059
Total wages and salaries 20,683
Total full-time and part-time employment 465,130
Total wage and salary jobs 367,291
Total other jobs 97,839
Selected Estimates of Alaska Income and Employment, 2014
Income
($ millions)
Employment
(jobs)
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, SA30 Economic Profile (updated 
September 30, 2015), www.bea.gov.  
 
In the tables on the following page, we compare estimated short-run income impacts of reducing 
the deficit with total personal income (Table V-3) and estimated short-run job impacts of 
reducing the deficit with total full-time and part-time employment (Table V-4).  Note that using 
smaller measures of total incomes or jobs would result in proportionally larger percentage short-
term economic impacts. 
 
Depending on which short-run impact estimates we use (low or high scenarios) and which 
combination of fiscal options we assume, the short-run income impacts of reducing the deficit by 
$3 billion could be between 5% and 10% of Alaska income (Table V-3).  Depending on which 
short-run impact estimates we use (low or high scenarios) and which combination of fiscal 
options we assume, the short-run job impacts of reducing the deficit by $3 billion could be 
between 3% and 6% of Alaska jobs (Table V-4).  The income and job impacts would be 
proportionally less for smaller total deficit reductions. 
 
Clearly the potential economic impacts of fully reducing the deficit are large. Reducing the 
deficit will significantly impact Alaska’s economy, regardless of how we do it.  But some 
combinations of options for closing the deficit would have smaller short-run impacts than others, 
particularly those that include saving less (adding less of Permanent Fund earnings to the 
principal as inflation proofing, or to the earnings reserve). 
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Table V-3. 
Four 
options
Spending cut: broad-based 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Income tax: progressive 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Dividend cut 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Saving less 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Income:  Low scenario 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Income:  High scenario 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%
Income:  Low scenario 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 1.5% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1%
Income:  High scenario 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 1.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
Income:  Low scenario 2.8% 2.9% 3.2% 1.2% 1.7% 1.6% 3.0% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2%
Income:  High scenario 3.2% 3.3% 3.6% 1.4% 1.9% 1.7% 3.4% 2.2% 2.1% 2.4% 2.5%
Income:  Low scenario 4.2% 4.4% 4.8% 1.9% 2.5% 2.3% 4.5% 2.9% 2.8% 3.2% 3.4%
Income:  High scenario 4.8% 5.0% 5.4% 2.2% 2.8% 2.6% 5.1% 3.3% 3.2% 3.6% 3.8%
Income:  Low scenario 5.6% 5.8% 6.5% 2.5% 3.4% 3.1% 6.0% 3.9% 3.7% 4.3% 4.5%
Income:  High scenario 6.4% 6.6% 7.2% 2.9% 3.7% 3.5% 6.7% 4.4% 4.2% 4.8% 5.1%
Income:  Low scenario 7.4% 4.9% 4.6% 5.4% 5.6%
Income:  High scenario 8.4% 5.5% 5.3% 6.0% 6.3%
Income:  Low scenario 8.9% 5.8% 5.6% 6.5% 6.7%
Income:  High scenario 10.1% 6.6% 6.4% 7.2% 7.6%
$3.0 billion
Note:  Table omits combination of options and total deficit reduction which would require reductions of more than $1 billion from any single option.
$500 million
$1.0 billion
$1.5 billion
$2.0 billion
$2.5 billion
Two options Three options
Combinations
of fiscal
options
$100 million
Estimated Income Impacts of Reducing the Deficit by Selected Total Amounts Using Different Potential Combinations of Fiscal Options,
Expressed as a Share of Estimated Total Alaska Personal Income in 2014 ($39.8 billion)
 
 
Table V-4. 
Four 
options
Spending cut: broad-based 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Income tax: progressive 50% 50% 50% 33% 0% 33% 33% 25%
Dividend cut 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Saving less 50% 50% 50% 33% 33% 33% 25%
Jobs:  Low scenario 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Jobs:  High scenario 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Jobs:  Low scenario 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6%
Jobs:  High scenario 1.1% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 1.1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8%
Jobs:  Low scenario 1.6% 1.7% 1.2% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 1.5% 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 1.2%
Jobs:  High scenario 2.2% 2.3% 1.8% 1.4% 1.0% 0.8% 2.1% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% 1.6%
Jobs:  Low scenario 2.5% 2.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1.0% 0.9% 2.3% 1.7% 1.6% 1.2% 1.7%
Jobs:  High scenario 3.3% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0% 1.4% 1.3% 3.2% 2.3% 2.2% 1.8% 2.4%
Jobs:  Low scenario 3.3% 3.5% 2.5% 2.1% 1.3% 1.2% 3.1% 2.3% 2.2% 1.7% 2.3%
Jobs:  High scenario 4.4% 4.6% 3.6% 2.7% 1.9% 1.7% 4.2% 3.1% 2.9% 2.4% 3.2%
Jobs:  Low scenario 3.9% 2.9% 2.7% 2.1% 2.9%
Jobs:  High scenario 5.3% 3.9% 3.7% 3.0% 3.9%
Jobs:  Low scenario 4.6% 3.5% 3.3% 2.5% 3.5%
Jobs:  High scenario 6.3% 4.6% 4.4% 3.6% 4.7%
$2.0 billion
$2.5 billion
$3.0 billion
Note:  Table omits combination of options and total deficit reduction which would require reductions of more than $1 billion from any single option.
Estimated Job Impacts of Reducing the Deficit by Selected Total Amounts Using Different Combinations of Fiscal Options,
Expressed as a Share of Estimated Total Alaska Full-Time and Part-Time Employment in  2014 (465,000 jobs)
Two options Three options
Combinations
of fiscal
options
$100 million
$500 million
$1.0 billion
$1.5 billion
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How Fast Should We Reduce the Deficit? 
 Our primary focus in this study was on the relative economic impacts of different fiscal options, 
rather than their total impacts on the economy, or about how fast we should reduce the deficit.  
We can, however, offer a few observations on this question. 
  
Fully closing the deficit in one year would have a large impact on an economy already weakened 
by cuts in oil-industry jobs and large cuts in state capital spending over the past few years that 
we haven’t yet felt the full effects of. We could delay—but not escape—some of these direct 
short-run economic impacts by spreading out deficit reduction over a longer period.    
  
But continued large deficits and draws from our savings would also have significant negative 
economic impacts.  These include but are not limited to: 
  
• Loss of future investment income.  For every billion dollars we draw down our remaining 
savings, we lose the potential to generate $50 million in future annual income, assuming a 
conservative 5% rate of return on investments. 
  
• Certain further downgrading of Alaska’s credit rating, and increases in future borrowing costs. 
  
• Potential future insufficient cash in the Permanent Fund earnings reserve to cover otherwise 
sustainable payouts of Permanent Fund investment earnings.  Over time, the Permanent Fund can 
generate large investment earnings to support sustainable state government spending and 
dividend payments. But several consecutive years of low earnings could deplete the earnings 
reserve of the cash needed to make these payouts.  The likelihood of that happening increases, 
the more the earnings reserve is drawn down by non-sustainable draws to cover deficits. 
  
More difficult to quantify, but perhaps the most important potential negative economic impact of 
continued large deficits, is continued and growing uncertainty—among Alaskans, Alaska 
businesses, resource industries, and public and private employees—about Alaska’s fiscal and 
economic future, and about whether Alaska will remain a good place for businesses to invest and 
for people to work, live, and call home.  Uncertainty causes both businesses and households to 
postpone investment.  Uncertainty increases the likelihood that young Alaskans will leave 
Alaska to seek better opportunities elsewhere. Uncertainty hurts public and private employee 
morale, turnover, and recruitment:  it increases the likelihood that the best public and private 
employees will leave to look for better opportunities elsewhere.  Uncertainty increases the 
likelihood that resource industries will choose to invest elsewhere.  Uncertainty causes 
businesses and households to focus on the negative effects of what may be coming, rather than 
on the opportunities the future holds. 
  
V-5 
 
Thus, we face a tradeoff between the short-run negative economic impacts of reducing the deficit 
and the significant short-run and longer-run economic impacts of not reducing the deficit.  Our 
economic adjustment to lower oil revenues will likely be smoother if we substantially reduce the 
deficit this year, and also clearly demonstrate to Alaskans, businesses, and investors how we will 
make the further changes necessary in spending, revenues, and uses of Permanent Fund earnings 
to achieve sustainable state finances, reduce uncertainty about future state spending and how we 
will pay for it, and build confidence in Alaska’s fiscal future. 
  
Our fundamental problem is that we have lost billions of dollars of oil revenue that formerly 
supported most of state General Fund spending—and that we are unlikely to regain.  We will 
have to adjust to this new reality.  We can’t avoid significant economic impacts from this 
adjustment.  We can only delay them by drawing down our savings, but we don’t have enough 
savings to delay them very long.  We can’t permanently support our economy by running 
deficits.  
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VI. OTHER ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ALASKA FISCAL OPTIONS 
In this chapter we briefly list some of the potential longer-term and indirect economic impacts of 
closing Alaska’s budget deficit under the fiscal options we analyzed in this study. We analyzed 
only the potential revenue impacts and short-run economic impacts of those options—which 
include several kinds of budget cuts and taxes, as well as cutting the Permanent Fund dividend 
and using more of the Permanent Fund earning the state currently saves.  All those options would 
also have longer-term and indirect impacts that we didn’t study. And there are important fiscal 
options currently under discussion—such as changes in oil taxes and credits—that we didn’t 
study at all. 
 
It was far beyond the scope of this study to estimate these other impacts.  The available funding 
for the study—and the time ISER researchers had to spend on it—limited what we were able to 
analyze.  We focused on revenue impacts and short-run economic impacts because they are 
important to the ongoing discussion of Alaska fiscal options, and because they are relatively 
straightforward to analyze.  
 
We didn’t study potential longer-term and indirect impacts of fiscal options, because they are 
more varied, more complex, and harder to estimate—due to the many complex feedback loops 
between state spending and revenues and Alaska’s economy and population over time.  
Similarly, we didn’t study potential impacts of changes in oil taxes and credits, because those 
impacts would be complex and difficult to predict and would require a major separate study. 
 
The potential longer-term and indirect impacts we identify below might be considered a start 
toward a more comprehensive list of other economic impacts that matter—and that we Alaskans 
should think about as we discuss fiscal options.  
 
In briefly talking about some of these other potential impacts, our purpose is not to offer any 
conclusions about how much weight they should or shouldn’t carry as arguments for or against 
any fiscal option. We simply want to emphasize that while this study has addressed some of the 
questions relevant to understanding the economic impacts of fiscal options, many other questions 
remain to be answered. 
 
Other Potential Economic Impacts of Spending Cuts 
Impacts of Reduced State Services 
The potential economic impacts of spending cuts go beyond job and income losses for state 
employees and the resulting multiplier impacts on other Alaska jobs and income.  They also 
include the potential impacts spending cuts could have on the level of state services. These range 
from direct, immediate, and obvious to indirect, longer-term, and less obvious.  For example:   
 
• Cuts in spending for the state ferry system could affect ferry service routes and timing—
which in turn could affect tourist travel to some communities and the tourism industry in 
those communities. 
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• Cuts in fisheries management spending could limit the ability of fisheries managers to 
monitor and research fisheries catches, salmon escapement, and fishery resource 
conditions. Given the state’s constitutional requirement to manage fisheries sustainably, 
such cuts could lead to more conservative fisheries management—reducing commercial 
fish harvests and sport fishing opportunities, with effects on commercial harvest values 
(and fish-tax revenues) and on incomes of sport-fishing guides. 
 
• Cuts in University of Alaska funding could affect the number and quality of program and 
course offerings, which could in turn affect the number of young Alaskans choosing to 
attend the University of Alaska.  In the short-term, such changes could influence how 
much of what young Alaskans spend on tuition, housing, food, recreation (and everything 
else) stays in Alaska—creating income and jobs—or leaves Alaska, if they choose other 
universities.  Over the longer-term, reduced UA offerings could affect how many young 
Alaskans stay in or leave Alaska permanently and Alaska’s future workforce. 
 
These are only a few examples of potential economic impacts of reduced state services; the list 
could be as long as the full range of state services.  Note that our point is not to argue that any of 
these spending cuts should not be made.  It is simply that Alaskans should understand that the 
economic impacts may exceed the short-term effects on jobs and income that we analyzed. Put 
differently, if we care about the economy, then we shouldn’t make decisions about what and how 
much to cut based just on how many jobs or how much income the spending creates, or how 
many jobs or how much income would be lost if the spending is cut. We should also think about 
what we get from the spending, and how what we get affects the economy. 
 
Impacts on Alaska Economic Development and Future Revenues 
Some kinds of state spending may be thought of as investments in economic development that 
may generate not only future economic benefits but also state revenues.  For example: 
 
• Transportation infrastructure projects may lower the costs of and stimulate new resource 
development, increasing potential future state revenues. 
 
• Marketing for tourism or seafood may increase tourism or seafood sales or prices, 
benefiting these industries and also increasing the taxes they pay. 
 
• Workforce training may reduce the costs of labor for new economic development and 
increase the share of jobs Alaskans can fill. 
 
There are many other examples of the potential adverse effects that cutting spending could 
arguably have on Alaska’s future economic development and revenues.  
 
In the extreme, the argument could be made that almost any kind of state spending is an 
“investment” in economic development.  Anything the state does to improve the quality of life 
for Alaskans, or reduces the cost of living or doing business in Alaska, could conceivably 
stimulate economic development by making Alaska a more attractive place for businesses to 
invest and for people to work and live. 
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In evaluating arguments about whether some kinds of state spending should not be cut because 
they are investments in economic development, it is important to consider the relative rates of 
return on these investments.  How much economic benefit is any given investment likely to 
create, and when will we get these benefits?  How much additional state revenue is the 
investment likely to generate, and when will we receive these revenues?  How do the economic 
benefits and financial rates of return compare with those of other potential state investments? 
 
Just because an investment might have economic benefits, or might generate revenues, does not 
necessarily mean the benefits outweigh the costs, or that it is the best use of available funds.   
 
Impacts on Future State Costs and Spending 
Some kinds of spending cuts may be penny-wise but pound-foolish: they may save money now, 
but may lead to higher costs in the future. 
 
Some kinds of costs can be temporarily but not permanently deferred. These include, but are not 
limited to, maintenance of state roads, buildings, and equipment.  The state could cut spending 
by deferring maintenance for some period.  But over time the quality and reliability of roads, 
buildings, and equipment deteriorates, and lack of maintenance can eventually lead to costly 
repairs or even the complete loss of assets.  Deferring costs can be a useful strategy for dealing 
temporary shortfalls in state funding.  But it is less likely to be a useful way of dealing with a 
long-term decline in state oil revenues. 
 
Some kinds of state spending today might help hold down costs tomorrow—and cutting those 
might increase the future need for and cost of some programs. Examples of spending that may 
help hold down future costs: 
 
• Spending for preventive medical services may reduce future costs of medical treatment. 
 
• Spending for alcohol and drug treatment programs, and prisoner rehabilitation and 
education, may reduce crime rates and recidivism and future costs of crime and prisons. 
 
Advocates for many kinds of programs argue that spending for their programs will more than 
pay off in reduced costs for other programs.  It can be difficult to tell whether this is actually the 
case, given the number and complexity of factors that drive demand for different state services.  
In some cases, there may be well-documented research that shows the benefits of some 
programs.  In other cases, the evidence may be weak or non-existent.   
 
We haven’t studied what kinds of spending cuts might cost money—by increasing the need for 
and cost of other kinds of spending—rather than save money.  Clearly this is an important 
question to be considered for some kinds of potential spending cuts. 
 
 
Impacts of Cost Shifting 
Some kinds of state spending cuts might shift more of the costs to local governments (and 
taxpayers) and to those who use state services.  Here are a few potential examples: 
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• Cuts in state revenue sharing for local governments could lead to increases in local taxes, 
to make up for any resulting shortfalls in local government revenue. 
 
• Cuts in state funding for retirement obligations could increase the share of those 
obligations local governments and school systems pay—which could also lead to higher 
local taxes. 
 
• Cuts in state agency budgets could lead to shifting of responsibilities to local government 
agencies—which would require increased local taxes to pay for the increased costs.  For 
example, if the state plows fewer roads or reduces the number of state troopers, local 
governments may face higher costs for road plowing or police protection. 
 
• Cuts in state agency budgets could also lead to increases in user fees for services these 
agencies provide.  For example, cuts in the ferry-system budget could lead to higher 
fares; cuts in the state-parks budget could lead to higher park user fees; and cuts in the 
Department of Fish and Game’s budget could lead to higher fees for sport fishing licenses 
and commercial fishing permits. 
 
Our point is not to argue against cost-shifting.  It may be appropriate for local governments or 
service users to pay more of the costs the state is currently paying.  Rather, our point is that the 
economic impacts of cost shifting would be more like those of tax increases than of spending 
cuts.  They may not necessarily result in less being spent on government services, but rather 
increases in what Alaskans have to pay for services, in the form of local taxes or user fees. 
 
Impacts on Federal Matching Funding 
Federal spending is a significant driver of Alaska’s economy.  Some kinds of federal spending, 
such as federal transportation projects, require the state to “match” a share of the federal funds.  
Cuts in state spending that are matches to bring in additional federal funding could have a 
significantly amplified economic effect.  The greater the ratio of federal spending to the required 
state match, the greater the potential economic impact of cutting state matching funds.   
 
We have not done (or seen) any analysis of how much of total state spending serves as a match 
for federal funds, or whether there have been—or there are proposed—cuts in state spending that 
would cost the state federal matching funds.  To clarify the potential effects of budget cuts, it 
would be useful to review how much of the funding for various state agencies serves as a match 
for federal funds, and how much and what kinds of federal funding those agencies bring in.  Our 
point is not to argue that the state should necessarily pay for anything that brings in federal 
funding.  It is simply that when state spending does bring in federal funding, the economic 
impacts of cutting that spending are magnified. 
 
Impacts on Public Employees 
The quality of services that state agencies, K-12 schools, and other state-funded entities provide 
depends on the quality, experience, and morale of the people who provide these services.  It 
matters a lot what kinds of people we have as state troopers, fishery managers, school teachers, 
and oil tax accountants—and in fact, in every kind of state government job.   
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How state spending is cut, and how decisions are made about spending cuts, will significantly 
affect working conditions for public employees and how they feel about their future career 
prospects—which in turn can significantly affect public employee morale, turnover, and 
recruitment.  Over time, these factors may significantly affect the quality of Alaska’s public 
workforce and the public services they provide.   
 
We are not arguing that state spending should not be cut, or that state staffing levels, pay, and 
benefits should not be scrutinized.  Clearly, given the seriousness of the financial challenge the 
state faces, every kind of state spending should be scrutinized.  But it is important to recognize 
that over time spending cuts, and how we make them, may affect not only the number of public 
employees but also what kinds of public employees we have. 
 
Other Potential Economic Impacts of Taxes 
Our analysis focused on potential revenue impacts and short-run economic impacts of selected 
tax options:  how much money they would collect from whom, and how the loss of disposable 
income would affect spending and the economy.  
 
In addition to the potential impacts we analyzed, taxes may have a wide variety of indirect and 
longer-term economic impacts—which are the subject of very broad and long-running economic 
and political debates.  In general, and in most states, taxes are a “necessary evil”—countries and 
states impose taxes not because they are good for the economy or because anyone likes paying 
taxes, but rather because there needs to be some level of government and there needs to be some 
way of paying for it.  Thus, the major economic and political debates are over: 
 
• What is the appropriate balance between the services and benefits government provides 
and the negative effects of taxes? 
 
• What kinds of taxes help keep the negative effects to a minimum? 
 
• What kinds of taxes are most fair? 
 
These same broad economic and political questions matter for Alaska, as we think about 
potential tax options for reducing the deficit.  Also, there are many specific questions related to 
potential negative and positive effects of tax options.  To name just a few, potential negative 
effects include: 
 
• Sales taxes might affect the extent to which Alaskans buy from local retailers rather than 
out-of-state or online retailers. 
 
• In areas where prices are high, people would pay relatively higher sales taxes for any 
given item than people would pay in areas where prices are lower. 
 
• Taxes on resource industries might reduce the rate of return on investments and make 
Alaska less competitive (relative to other resource-producing states or regions), thus 
reducing resource industry investment and jobs.   
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• Taxing fish-processing workers might increase the wages fish processors need to pay to 
attract workers, adding to their costs and reducing prices paid fishermen. 
 
• Taxes have both administrative and enforcement costs.  Some kinds of taxes have 
significantly higher administrative costs than others. For example, sales taxes would 
likely have significantly higher administrative costs than income taxes (particularly 
income taxes tied directly to federal tax obligations). 
 
Not all the potential economic effects of taxes would necessarily be negative.  Examples of 
potential positive effects include: 
 
• When people pay taxes, they have skin in the game in political decisions about spending.  
If they don’t pay taxes, they may not care as much about—and pay less attention to—
what government spends and for what. The more they pay in taxes, the more careful 
attention they may pay to spending (and the less spending they may demand). 
 
• When people and industries pay taxes, economic growth and population growth pay for 
themselves. Currently, when the economy and the population grow, most Alaskans and 
most Alaska businesses pay relatively low taxes to state government. That’s good for 
business, but it’s not good for state finances. The demand for and cost of state 
government services—such as schools and roads—increases as the economy and 
population grow, but state revenues don’t increase enough to pay those higher costs.  This 
problem has been called the “Alaska disconnect.” If Alaska residents and businesses paid 
higher taxes, it would help reduce the Alaska disconnect. 
 
Our point is not to argue for or against any of these potential negative or positive effects of taxes.  
Rather, our point is that these potential longer-term and indirect impacts of taxes matter—and 
deserve further discussion and research as we consider Alaska’s fiscal options. 
 
 
Other Potential Economic Impacts of Dividend Cuts 
Alaskans have widely differing perspectives on the Permanent Fund dividend program.  Since 
the 1980s, the state has made annual cash payments—dividends—from the earnings of the 
Permanent Fund, to all residents. Some Alaskans emphasize what they see as positive effects of 
the dividend program (and corresponding potential negative effects of dividend cuts).  Others 
emphasize what they see as negative effects of the dividend program (and corresponding 
potential positive effects of dividend cuts).   
 
To some extent, these different perspectives reflect fundamental philosophical differences about 
what Permanent Fund dividends are.  Some Alaskans argue that dividends are the people’s share 
of Alaska resource wealth— and that the money is theirs, rather than money the government 
gives them.  Other Alaskans argue that the dividends are government spending like any other 
kind of spending, and should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and prioritization as other 
spending.   
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Beyond these philosophical issues, there are important questions about a wide range of potential 
indirect and long-term effects of dividend cuts or other changes in the dividend program.  Some 
examples include: 
 
• How would dividend cuts affect the ability of lower-income residents to live in Alaska, 
particularly in high-cost rural areas? 
 
• How would dividend cuts affect the ability of Alaskans to accumulate wealth for big-
ticket costs and investments, such as college education and down payments on homes? 
 
• How would dividend cuts affect Alaska wage rates?  Would lower dividends mean 
employers would have to pay workers more, because people would need to earn more to 
live in Alaska? 
 
• How would dividend cuts affect how many and what kinds of people move to Alaska or 
leave Alaska?  Do dividends “attract” poor people or large families to Alaska? 
 
• Would dividend cuts affect how much Alaskans feel they have a stake in the Permanent 
Fund—and their commitment to increasing and protecting it over time? 
 
Our point is not to argue for or against the philosophical perspectives on whose money the 
dividends are, or what the longer-term and indirect impacts of the dividend might be.  Our point 
is that what matters, in considering dividend cuts, clearly goes beyond the short-run impacts, to 
longer-term and more complex potential impacts.  
 
Conclusions 
Choices Alaskans make about closing the budget deficit would affect Alaska’s economy and 
society in many important ways beyond the short-term economic impacts we estimated for this 
study.  We should base our fiscal choices not only on their short-term effects but also on what 
they might mean for Alaska’s economy and society over time.   
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APPENDIX A 
ESTIMATION OF REVENUE IMPACTS OF FISCAL OPTIONS 
This appendix provides technical documentation and detailed results for our analyses of fiscal 
options involving new revenues or dividend cuts, including the total and relative shares of 
revenues that would be collected from different income groups, and impacts on expenditures 
among different income groups.  
 
Data and Methods 
The analysis relied on three primary data sets. Data from Alaska respondents to the national 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) provided information on household expenditures and 
potential sales tax revenues and effects. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tabulations of federal 
income returns of Alaska residents provided information on potential income tax revenues. The 
American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (ACS PUMS) provided 
demographic information and income of Alaska residents to scale up effects per person and per 
household to the state as a whole. Estimating total revenues and the distribution of effects across 
households required linking these three different data sets, each of which uses a different unit of 
analysis. 
 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) 
The CES is an annual survey conducted in all 50 states by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm). The survey unit is a “consumer unit” (CU), which is 
basically a family. Residents of group quarters such as student housing, remote industrial work 
sites, and jails, are not included in the survey. The CES consists of two parts:  an interview 
survey that asks about expenditures over the previous three months, and a separate weekly diary 
survey for items such as food and household supplies that are typically purchased frequently in 
small quantities. The most recent year of data available for research—the Public Use Microdata 
(PUMD)—represents expenditures in 2014. The Alaska sample size is quite limited. We 
combined the 2013 and 2014 CES PUMD samples, which provided 678 quarterly observations 
on 279 CUs (families). 
 
To analyze expenditure patterns, we added all the observations on expenditures during the 
previous three months on each type of product for each CU. We multiplied the sum of 
expenditures by four, divided by the number of quarters observed, to obtain an estimate of 
annual expenditures for each CU. We then combined the detailed annual expenditure categories 
into six large categories: food at home, goods, services, shelter, health care, and education 
(primarily tuition). The goods category included food away from home, alcoholic beverages, 
tobacco products, household furnishings, apparel, vehicle purchases (new and used), gasoline 
and motor oil, reading materials, other household expenditures, and miscellaneous goods. The 
services category included telecommunications services, insurance (including home, vehicle, and 
life), domestic services, child care, home and vehicle maintenance and repair, vehicle rental, 
public transportation, entertainment, and personal care services. The shelter category included 
rent, other lodging, and household utilities, excluding telecommunications. Expenditures on loan 
payment interest and principal were not included in the analysis. 
 
It is important to understand the limitations of the Alaska CES sample. The number of 
households sampled each year is relatively small. It is not clear what the geographic coverage is, 
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so it is not possible to determine if the sample is geographically representative. Despite these 
limitations, the CES remains a valuable tool for understanding consumer expenditure patterns 
and potential sales tax revenues, as it is the only source of expenditures available for analysis at 
the household level.  
 
CES data can be summarized by per-capita household income and many other household 
characteristics. But the small sample size and unknown geographic coverage makes these 
breakdowns unreliable. We instead estimated equations to predict how much a family would 
spend on the various categories of goods and services as a function of per-capita income and the 
number of people in the CU (household size). We estimated both linear and loglinear 
relationships. The equations were estimated as censored regressions, to address the fact that 
expenditures could not be negative. The loglinear specifications generally provided a better fit to 
the data, except for education expenditures; the linear censored regression provided a more 
realistic prediction for education expenditures, probably because relatively few households had 
education expenditures.  
 
We used the equations estimated from the CES to estimate the tax base for sales taxes, as well as 
the effect of various revenue measures on expenditures and the economy, as described below. 
Appendix B, Tables B-1 through B-8, display the complete statistical results of the equations 
used to project expenditures in the six categories. 
 
IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data 
The Internal Revenue Service publishes data summarizing federal individual income tax returns 
at various geographic scales through its Statistics of Income (SOI) program. We estimated the 
relationship between total income and taxable income, as well as average and marginal effective 
tax rates for tax returns of people at different income levels, from published tables at the state 
level (https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historic-Table-2). We then used the estimated 
relationships between total income, taxable income, and income tax payments to estimate both 
the amount and distribution of hypothetical state income taxes and the effect of state taxes and 
changes in Permanent Fund Dividend payments on Alaska taxpayers’ federal income tax 
liabilities.  
 
The IRS groups tax returns by income per return. The unit is therefore the tax return rather than 
the household or family. The main important difference between tax returns and households is 
that married taxpayers filing separately generate two returns. We therefore adjusted the 
distribution of income per return to account for returns with a married-filing-separately status. 
 
The IRS SOI has a number of limitations in addition to the problem of joint tax returns. Not all 
taxpayers file returns. In particular, low-income households are much less likely to file tax 
returns. Neither the number of exemptions, nor number of dependents plus one, exactly captures 
household size, due not only to the issue of married taxpayers filing separately (mentioned 
above), but also because there are often multiple taxpayers living in the same household. For 
example, employed adult children living with their parents will likely file their own returns, as 
will unmarried partners living together. The income reported to the IRS may differ from income 
reported on surveys such as the CES and ACS, especially for self-employed taxpayers. 
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Despite its limitations, the IRS SOI provide an essential data source that permits us to estimate 
how effective tax rates vary by income as well as total federal taxes paid: the best base for 
estimating how much money a state income tax might raise. We used data for the most recent 
year available: 2014 tax filings, representing income earned in 2013. 
 
American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (ACS PUMS)  
Neither the CES nor IRS SOI data sets represent the entire population of Alaskans. To scale to 
the Alaska population and properly represent demographic patterns and the distribution of 
income, we rely on the ACS PUMS (https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-
documentation/pums/documentation.html).  
 
The ACS is an annual survey of households and residents of group quarters conducted by the 
U.S. Census Bureau. It provides the official statistics on income, household composition, poverty 
rates, and many other social and economic characteristics of the population. Income in the ACS 
is self-reported, so it includes whatever the respondents say they earned. It should include PFD 
payments for everyone in the household that received a dividend. It will also include cash public 
assistance, but not food stamps or any other “in kind” assistance. 
 
The PUMS is a five-percent sample of survey returns, stripped of information that could identify 
individual households. The main difference between the PUMS and the original surveys is that 
geographic information is limited to large regions of Alaska. We used PUMS data for 2014, the 
most recent year available. The individual and household income reported in the 2014 survey 
represents income earned in 2013.  Note, as discussed below, that the PFD was $900 in 2013, 
which is significantly less than it was in 2014 or 2015. 
 
The ACS reports both total household income and income of individuals. We computed per-
capita household income by dividing household income by the number of people in the 
household. Household income is not defined for residents of group quarters, so we assumed that 
per-capita household income of those in group quarters was the same as individual income. To 
develop the distribution of income, we divided all the households into ten groups, ranked by per-
capita household income. For this step, residents of group quarters were considered households 
with a household size of one. Each decile of the income distribution therefore represents ten 
percent of households, plus residents of group quarters, rather than ten percent of individuals. 
Since lower-income households tend to be larger than higher-income households, the poorest 
deciles include somewhat more people than the richer deciles. 
 
Table A-1 shows the number of people, average household income, and per-capita income for 
the ten deciles of households. The data represent 2013 income in 2013 dollars. In addition to the 
736,000 Alaska residents the census bureau estimated for 2013, the Alaska Department of Labor 
reported 86,000 non-residents were employed in Alaska and earned an average of nearly $28,000 
per worker (http://laborstats.alaska.gov/reshire/NONRES.pdf). It should be noted that this figure 
understates the total number of non-resident workers, because it does not include federal 
government employees—including active-duty military personnel—or self-employed people. 
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Table A-1. Alaska Population, Persons per Household, and Per-capita Income 
by Per-capita Household Income Percentile 
 
 
Income percentile, households 
 
Population  
Average 
persons per 
household  
 
Per-capita 
income in 2013 
Per-capita 
income with 
$2,000 PFDa 
Lowest 10 percent of households      87,006  2.94  $    3,594  $    4,694  
10-20th percentile      89,660  3.03   10,465     11,565  
20-30th percentile      76,040  2.62    15,613     16,713  
30-40th percentile      84,404  2.84    20,412     21,512  
40-50th percentile      85,077  2.93    25,935     27,035  
50-60th percentile      78,178  2.66    32,818     33,918  
60-70th percentile      67,327  2.27    40,265     41,365  
70-80th percentile      63,722  2.18    51,154     52,254  
80-90th percentile      57,284  1.95    65,707     66,807  
Highest 10 percent of 
households 
     47,771  1.63  126,890   127,990  
     
All residents    736,471  2.51  $  33,578   $  34,678  
Non-resident workers      86,455      27,760     27,771  
 
aAssuming all income is the same as in 2013 except the Permanent Fund Dividend, and that one 
percent of dividends is paid to non-residents. 
 
Source: American Community Survey 2014 Public Use Microdata Sample. Group quarters 
residents included as one-person households. 
 
 
In 2013, the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) was $900. Dividends have been larger in 
more recent years. For comparison, the last column of Table A-1 shows what per-capita income 
would be if all income except the PFD were the same as in 2013, but with a PFD of $2,000. Data 
from federal income tax filings 
(http://labor.alaska.gov/research/pop/migration/data/IRSMigrationState.xls) and the ACS 
(http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/cen/acsdetails.cfm) indicate that each year about five percent of 
residents moved to Alaska within the previous year. In the past few years, the population has 
been stable, indicating that about six percent moved out of state every year.  
 
Although only residents can receive PFDs, some of those moving away would likely have 
received dividends. Leaving aside the issue of fraud, there are many reasons why some people 
might have filed legitimate PFD applications early in the year but unexpectedly moved before 
the PFD was paid out—such as dissolving relationships, military transfers, job loss, and family 
medical issues. If we assume that one-sixth of those leaving each year received PFDs, then non-
residents would have received about one percent of PFD payments. 
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Estimating Revenues and Their Distribution 
Using the CES, IRS, and ACS data to estimate potential state revenues generated by various 
fiscal options—and the distribution across the population of the impact on disposable income— 
involved a number of steps. First, we applied the relationships between total income per tax 
return, the number of dependents, taxable income, and average and marginal tax rates in the IRS 
SOI data to household income and household composition in the ACS PUMS households, to 
estimate federal income taxes per ACS household. Persons in households reporting a marital 
status of separated were assumed to have a tax status of married filing separately. One person in 
households with children under 18 but no married adults was assumed to file as head of 
household, and any others with income above the IRS threshold were assumed to file as single 
taxpayers. 
 
Our initial attempt to impose the federal income tax structure on ACS households generated 
federal income taxes about 25 percent higher than actual tax payments reported in the IRS SOI 
data. There are a number of possible explanations for that discrepancy. Chief among them are the 
likelihood that income reported in the ACS exceeded income reported to the IRS, especially for 
self-employed individuals, and that more households generated multiple separate tax returns than 
we estimated. Consequently, we multiplied the computed federal income taxes by 0.8 to scale the 
total tax payments to the amount actually received by the IRS. 
 
In the next step we applied the expenditure functions estimated from the CES consumer units to 
the per-capita income and household size of the ACS PUMS population. In addition to residents, 
non-resident workers and visitors contribute to retail sales in Alaska. Data on retail expenditures 
by non-residents is severely limited. Alaska alcoholic beverage tax receipts 
(http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/index.aspx?60165) show that alcohol 
sales in the three summer months are about 10 percent higher than in the September to May 
average.  Sales tax receipts for Juneau and the Kenai Peninsula Borough show a 50 percent 
increase in the summer, but these boroughs are not representative of the state as a whole.  
 
Given the uncertainties, we made rough estimates of non-resident expenditures on food at home 
and shelter in proportion to non-resident wages as a share of total state wages. We estimated that 
15 percent of commodities and 10 percent of services are purchased by non-residents. It should 
be noted that these are generous estimates of non-resident expenditures. The true figures are 
unlikely to be higher than these estimates, and could be somewhat lower.  
 
After including estimated purchases by non-residents, the total estimate expenditures still fall 
somewhat short of County Business Patterns (CBP) retail sales data for Alaska, compiled by the 
U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/). CBP data indicate that 2013 total 
expenditures in Alaska in the six categories we modeled amounted to $158 billion. We therefore 
adjusted estimated total expenditures to scale to the CBP total.  
 
Table A-2 shows estimated per-capita expenditures for the six categories of expenditures 
analyzed in the same per-capita income deciles as in Table A-1.The bottom rows of the table 
show estimated total expenditures for residents and non-residents in the same categories. As 
mentioned before, the figures exclude mortgages payments (other than insurance) and other loan 
payments.  
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Table A-2. Estimated Annual Per-Capita Expenditures by Six Expenditure Categories 
 
Income percentile, 
households 
Food at 
home  
Other 
commodities Services  Shelter 
Health 
care Education  
Lowest 10 percent of 
households 
$ 1,775   $ 1,299  $   892  $ 3,584  $  12  $      -  
10-20th percentile    2,087         2,718     1,866   3,520      85             -  
20-30th percentile    2,332         3,677     2,533    4,022       179             -  
30-40th percentile    2,389         4,520     3,108     3,745     320           16  
40-50th percentile    2,472         5,449     3,744     3,648     534         420  
50-60th percentile    2,652         6,564     4,520     3,983     842         194  
60-70th percentile    2,883         7,729     5,342     4,603  1,217             -  
70-80th percentile    3,048         9,361     6,476     4,784  1,992             -  
80-90th percentile    3,295       11,454     7,944     5,289  3,255        196  
Highest 10 percent of 
households 
   3,928       19,526   13,600     6,271  12,466     3,582  
       
Average, all households $ 2,584   $  6,382  $ 4,411  $ 4,194 $1,563  $   319  
       
Total, residents ($ millions) $ 1,903 $  4,700 $ 3,249 $ 3,088 $1,151 $   235 
Non-residents ($ millions) 154 7050 325 250 93 19 
Total expenditures ($ 
millions) 
$ 2,057 $  5,405 $ 3,574 $ 3,338 $1,244 $   254 
 
Source: Estimated from Consumer Expenditure Survey, combined 2013 and 2014 Alaska sample 
households, and U.S. Census, County Business Patterns 
 
Total Revenues Raised and Distribution Effects of Broad-Based Revenue Options 
To analyze the effects of potential revenue options, we examined five specific potential broad-
based fiscal measures that can be imposed at different rates to raise varying amounts of revenue. 
For the analysis, we examined hypothetical options of a similar scale: each measure was 
designed to raise $350-$400 million annually: 
 
• Two percent flat rate income tax 
• Ten percent federal income tax surcharge 
• A $600 reduction in the annual PFD 
• Four percent sales tax, excluding food at home, health care, shelter, and education 
• Three percent sales tax including food at home and shelter, but excluding education and 
health care 
 
In addition to these five measures, we also analyzed the effects of a potential state property tax. 
We assumed that property taxes levied by local governments would be credited from the state 
tax, analogous to the way that the state credits local governments in the existing state petroleum 
property tax. This makes it more difficult to scale than the other broad-based measures. Since the 
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highest local property tax rate is currently 20 mils (2 percent), and the state already taxes 
petroleum property at that rate, we examined the potential effects of a 20-mil state property tax. 
 
Total Revenue Raised 
Table A-3 summarizes the total estimated revenues raised, and the amounts from residents and 
non-residents, for the five hypothetical options. As mentioned above, the PFD reduction assumes 
that one percent of dividends are paid to people who are no longer Alaska residents when they 
receive the payments.  
 
Table A-3. Estimated Resident, Non-resident, and Total Revenues Raised 
Under Five Potential Revenue Measures 
 
 Total revenue raised ($ millions per year) 
Revenue measure Alaska 
residents 
Non-
residents 
Total, residents 
and non-
residents 
2 percent flat rate income tax  $366   $ 29   $396  
10 percent federal income tax surcharge  $338   $ 28   $366  
$600 cut in PFD  $380   $  4   $384  
4 percent sales tax excluding food at home, 
health care, shelter, and education 
 $318   $ 41   $359  
3 percent sales tax excluding education and 
health care 
 $388  $ 45   $ 433  
 
As shown in Table A-4, we estimated that a 20-mil tax on the full value of real and personal 
property, excluding oil and gas property already subject to state property taxation, would yield 
$1.7 billion per year. To estimate the state property tax base, we started with the full and true 
value of real and personal property as determined by the Alaska state assessor’s office, which 
was $83 billion in 2015 (https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/4/pub/OSA/2015-
Full.pdf). 
 
Areas of Alaska outside the boundaries of established boroughs or cities that don’t levy property 
taxes are not included in the state assessor’s report. To estimate the statewide total property 
value, we multiplied the state assessor’s figure for real property by the ratio of the state total 
value of housing to the value of housing in the organized boroughs of Alaska, as reported in the 
American Community Survey (ACS). The state assessor’s figure for real property includes 
commercial and industrial real estate (except oil and gas property) as well as housing; we 
assumed that the ratio of commercial real estate to residential housing was the same in the 
unorganized areas as in the boroughs. We estimated the value of rental housing by multiplying 
the reported monthly rent by 120. We estimated the state total personal property by multiplying 
the state assessor’s estimate of personal property in the established boroughs by the ratio of state 
A-8 
 
total number of motor vehicles to the number of vehicles in the established boroughs, as reported 
in the ACS. Taxable personal property includes mobile homes, airplanes, and boats, as well as 
vehicles, so our assumption was that the ratio of all personal property to motor vehicles was the 
same in the boroughs as outside the boroughs.  
 
Table A-4. Estimated Tax Base and Revenues Raised from a 20mil State Property Tax with 
Local Exemption, Excluding State-Assessed Oil and Gas Property 
 
 Real 
property 
Personal 
property 
Total 
  (Million dollars) 
Boroughsa  $ 71,084   $   9,561   $ 80,645  
Cities in unorganized borougha  $   2,076   $      411   $   2,487  
Total municipalities with property taxesa  $ 73,160   $   9,971  $ 83,131  
Estimated unorganized borough property tax baseb  $   5,740   $     560   $   6,300  
Potential additional tax basec  $   3,663   $      150   $   3,813  
Potential state total property tax base  $ 76,824   $ 10,121   $ 86,945  
tax rate (mils) 20.0   
Annual tax revenues    $   1,739  
 2015 local property tax revenuesa   $      924  
 Potential annual new state revenues   $      815  
 
a Source: Full and true value as determined by the state assessor, Alaska Taxable, 2015. 
b Estimated from American Community Survey, ratio of Census Areas in the Unorganized 
Borough to Borough Totals, 2010 - 2014 average. 
c Total unorganized borough less cities in unorganized borough levying property taxes. 
 
As shown in Table A-4, the scaled-up estimate of statewide property value was $87 billion, 
which is $3.8 billion more than the value currently subject to property taxation at the local level. 
Applying a 20-mil levy yields annual tax revenues of $1.7 billion. Subtracting the $924 million 
collected by local governments in 2015 leaves $815 million in potential new state revenues from 
the property tax.  
 
Figure A-1 compares the percentages of revenues paid by residents, non-residents, and the 
federal government that the state receives under the various fiscal options. The federal 
government “pays” for a portion of the revenues because federal income taxes will be reduced 
when PFD payments fall for most taxpayers. Alaska taxpayers itemizing deductions can deduct 
property taxes and either state income or sales taxes from federal taxable income. Information on 
non-resident property ownership is not systematically available, making estimates of the share of 
property tax revenues contributed by non-residents highly uncertain. Businesses can deduct 
property taxes from federal taxable income. To the extent that businesses pass the property tax 
on to their customers, non-residents purchasing goods and services from Alaska businesses 
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would also be contributing a portion of the taxes along with residents. The estimated percentage 
of property taxes paid by businesses (other than housing-rental businesses) times the non-
resident share of total expenditures amounts to 2.8 percent of property taxes. Property taxes on 
businesses not owned by Alaskans and selling products primarily outside Alaska—such as mines 
and fish processing plants—would not generally fall on Alaska residents either. Property tax 
assessment rolls for the Mat-Su Borough and the Kenai Peninsula Borough show 7-10 percent of 
locally assessed value of property is owned by people who are not Alaska residents. Given the 
limited information available, we estimate, as shown in Figure A-1, that non-residents would 
contribute 8.6 percent of property tax revenues, after netting out the share contributed by the 
federal government through reduced individual and corporate income taxes. 
 
Figure A-1 
 
 
The two state income tax options differ only in the tax-rate structure. The first tax option 
assumed a flat two percent rate on taxable income, while the tax rate for the second option was 
structured to be ten percent of the federal tax rate for that level of taxable income. State income 
or sales taxes are potentially deductible from federal taxable income. We assumed, however, that 
the state tax law would require that deductions for Alaska taxes would have to be added back in 
to the state definition of taxable income. Both income taxes therefore assumed that the tax base 
for the state tax was equal to federal taxable income before state tax deductions. We did, 
however, consider the potential for Alaska taxpayers to deduct the Alaska tax from their taxable 
income for federal tax purposes. We estimated the federal tax savings as the Alaska tax times the 
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marginal tax rate times the percentage of taxpayers at each income level itemizing deductions, 
according to the IRS SOI data.  
 
Distribution of the Revenue Burden Among Alaska Households 
Figure A-2 compares how each of the broad-based revenue measures discussed above affects 
per-capita disposable income—income net of taxes—for households with different levels of per-
capita income. Because each revenue option raises a different amount of revenue, the numbers in 
Figure A-2 are normalized to show the disposable income loss per $100 million of revenue 
raised. We assumed that the entire amount of property taxes assessed on rental property would be 
passed on to renters. Although renters might not feel the full impact of the tax immediately, the 
higher costs to landlords would likely get built into new rental contracts as old contracts expire.  
 
Property taxes paid by businesses would also almost certainly be passed on to customers. The 
only exception would likely be natural resource exports such as fish and minerals, where prices 
are set by world markets, not Alaska supply and demand. To assess the distribution of these 
business property taxes among Alaska households, we assumed that the property tax would add 
to the cost of living in proportion to non-shelter expenditures. 
 
Reducing the PFD by $156 per person and diverting the revenue to state government would raise 
$100 million. However, only the poorest households would actually lose the full amount. Most 
households get a portion of the loss of income back in reduced federal income taxes. The higher 
the household’s per-capita income, the more the taxes are reduced; per-capita disposable income 
of the richest ten percent of households would only fall on average by $112. For all the other 
measures, the amount paid would rise as per-capita income rises, although in varying degrees. 
  
The ten percent of households with the highest per-capita income would pay about five times as 
much as the poorest ten percent for the sales tax including food at home and shelter. They would 
pay about 12 times as much if the sales tax excludes food and shelter, about the same multiple as 
the state property tax. In contrast, the ten percent of households with the highest per-capita 
income would pay about 70 times as much flat rate income tax as the poorest 10 percent, and 
about 160 times as much with the income tax surcharge. 
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Figure A-2 
 
 
 
A fiscal measure is considered progressive if the percentage collected rises as income rises, and 
regressive if the percentage collected falls as income rises. Figure A-3 shows how the various 
fiscal measures would reduce disposable income for households for different per-capita income 
percentiles. The figure shows that the 2 percent flat rate income tax is progressive at lower 
income scales, due to the fixed exemptions and deductions for the tax base: federal taxable 
income. The 10 percent income tax surcharge is more progressive, following the progressive 
structure of the federal income tax. Even with the progressive rates, the income tax surcharge 
would reduce per-capita disposable income of the richest ten percent of households by about 0.5 
percent per $100 million raised. 
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Figure A-3 
 
 
In contrast to the income tax measures, the other fiscal options are quite regressive. The three 
percent sales tax option has lower rate but a broader base than the four percent option. The two 
types of expenditures excluded in the four percent tax -- food at home and shelter -- vary much 
less with income than do expenditures for other goods and services. In fact, because the shelter 
category includes rent but excludes payments for owner-occupied housing, and higher income 
households are much more likely to own their homes, there is very little variation in shelter 
expenditures across the different income percentiles. This makes sales taxes more regressive if 
they include food and shelter in the tax base. Non-residents also purchase less food at home and 
shelter relative to residents than they purchase other potentially taxable goods and services. 
 
The poorest ten percent would lose 1.1 percent of per-capita disposable income with a sales tax 
that includes food at home and shelter, while the richest 10 percent would lose only 0.2 percent. 
Even if food at home and shelter were excluded, the sales tax would still reduce per-capita 
disposable income of the poorest ten percent of households by twice as much as for the richest 
ten percent. The distribution of property taxes, as mentioned above, is very similar to the 
distribution of a sales tax that includes food and home and shelter. The reduction in the PFD is 
the most regressive of all. For every $100 million raised with PFD cuts, the ten percent of 
households with the lowest income lose 3.3 percent of per-capita disposable income, compared 
with only 0.1 percent among households with the highest incomes. 
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Effects of Revenue Measures on Expenditures 
All the fiscal options will have some adverse effect on the economy, because they reduce 
disposable income. As disposable income falls, households spend less on goods and services. 
However, the amount a tax increase or spending cut changes spending depends on how 
households react to the change in their economic circumstances, and how markets respond to the 
changes in household behavior. How households and markets will react is not known, causing 
substantial uncertainty in estimates of economic impacts of different measures. Without solid 
information, one is forced to make assumptions, which generally fall into two categories. First, 
one must make assumptions about how best to calculate the change in disposable income that 
drives changes in spending patterns. Second, one must make assumptions about how changes in 
disposable income affect spending.  
 
The IMPLAN input-output model used to estimate the indirect (multiplier) effects of changes in 
spending has a set of embedded assumptions about income and spending. Because IMPLAN is 
based on regional output rather than regional income, it uses a place-of-work accounting 
framework that does not fully represent the distribution of effects for Alaska residents. That is 
why we use the census/ACS income data to represent the distribution of the effects of revenue 
measures. IMPLAN has more complete information on spending than is available from the 
Alaska data in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, but its reliance on national expenditure data to 
estimate spending patterns may less accurately reflect how Alaska households would respond to 
loss of disposable income. In this section we discuss deriving estimates of the effects of revenue 
measures on expenditures using the Census/ACS and Alaska CES data. Appendix D discusses 
methods for deriving estimates of effects of revenue measures on expenditures using IMPLAN. 
 
Table A-5 shows how the main assumptions about income and spending compare for the 
IMPLAN vs. census methods. In general, the IMPLAN assumptions imply both a higher 
sensitivity of disposable income to changes in taxes and income and a bigger impact on spending 
per dollar change in disposable income. Both methods include wages of non-resident workers. 
But neither probably accurately captures the income of self-employed non-residents such as 
commercial fishermen.  
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Table A-5. Assumptions About Income and Spending for Two Methods of Estimating 
Economic Impacts of Spending Cuts and Revenue Measures 
 
Assumption IMPLAN Census 
Household income driving spending patterns includes   
 Wages of residents and non-residents working in Alaska x x 
 Income Alaskans earn from working outside the state  x 
 Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend payments x x 
 Income of self-employed Alaska residents from work in 
Alaska 
x x 
 Income of self-employed Alaskans from work outside Alaska  x 
 Income of self-employed non-residents from work in Alaska   
 Income Alaska residents receive from Alaska investments x x 
 Income non-residents receive from Alaska investments x  
 Income Alaska residents receive from non-Alaska investments  x 
 Employer-paid job benefits x  
 In-kind assistance such as food stamps x  
 Rent homeowners avoid by owning their dwellings x  
Spending patterns driving economic impacts   
 Spending patterns based on national expenditure data x  
 Spending patterns based on Alaska-specific data  x 
 Spending changes in proportion to income x  
 Spending patterns differ between residents and non-residents  x 
 Resident households adjust spending patterns with income  x 
 Loan payments change in proportion to income x  
 Loan payments assumed fixed in short term  x 
 Change in housing prices considered part of spending change x  
 Change in housing prices ignored (benefits cancel out costs)  x 
 
 
Using the expenditure functions estimated for the Alaska households in the CES, we derived 
estimates of the effect on disposable income changes on retail purchases resulting from the fiscal 
options. Figure A-5 summarizes the estimated effects of the six fiscal options on total 
expenditures, measured as expenditure loss per thousand dollars of revenue raised. Income taxes 
have the least effect on expenditures. The two different income tax options and the sales tax that 
excludes food at home and shelter have nearly identical effects on the economy: a reduction of 
$507-512 per $1,000 of revenues. The sales tax measure that includes food at home has a 
somewhat larger adverse effect on expenditures. The PFD cut has the largest effect—a reduction 
of $646 per thousand dollars of revenue raised—with the property tax having an intermediate 
effect between that of sales taxes and income taxes and that of the PFD cut. 
 
Three factors explain the differences in expenditure effects among the various measures: the 
share of revenues contributed by non-residents, the share paid by the federal government, and 
how progressive or regressive the measure is. Lower-income Alaskans typically spend a higher 
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share of their income than higher-income Alaskans do, so more regressive measures will have a 
larger adverse effect on expenditures. Alaska. The impact of the PFD cut falls almost exclusively 
on residents, and it is highly regressive, so it has the largest adverse impact on the economy per 
dollar of revenues raised. The property tax is as regressive as the sales tax, but higher-income 
taxpayers who pay larger property taxes can deduct the state tax from federal taxable income, 
and non-residents pay a higher proportion of sales taxes. However, it must be emphasized that 
our estimates of the effect of property taxes on expenditures are much more uncertain than the 
estimates for other types of taxes, due to the lack of information on non-resident property owners 
and the effect on the cost of living of property taxes on commercial property.  
 
Although reducing the PFD is much more regressive than imposing a sales tax, especially a sales 
tax that excludes food at home and shelter, the sales taxes would actually cause a bigger drop in 
expenditures. The reason is that households with the lowest income, who lose the most with the 
PFD cut, do not have much money to spend to begin with.  
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Figure A-5 
 
 
Table A-6 shows that how sensitive different types of expenditures are to the loss of disposable 
income varies among the potential measures. Expenditures on health care and education are the 
most sensitive to disposable income loss. Food at home is not as sensitive as other goods and 
services. Shelter is the least sensitive, although the large reduction in disposable income for low-
income people from a sizable cut in the PFD could lead to a rise in homelessness. Another 
potential consequence of raising taxes to provide more revenue for state government is a 
reduction in prices for owner-occupied homes.  
 
The CES expenditures do not include home purchases. A loss of disposable income is bound to 
have some adverse effect on housing markets. However, because the percentage reduction in 
disposable income for all the fiscal measures is relatively small for the upper half of the income 
distribution—the households most likely to be considering buying a home—the effect is likely to 
be small. Reductions in the state work force, for example, would likely have a much greater 
adverse effect on housing markets. 
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Table A-6. Estimated Impact of Potential Revenue Measures 
on Six Categories of Expenditures 
 
Total change in 
expenditures ($000s) 
2 percent 
flat rate 
income tax 
10 percent 
federal 
income tax 
surcharge 
$600 cut in 
PFD 
4% sales 
tax excl. 
food, rent, 
health 
3% sales 
tax excl. 
health and 
education 
2% property 
tax w local 
credit 
Food at home $   (4,181)  $    (3,429)  $    (9,799)  $  (5,037)  $  (7,275)  $  (13,121) 
Other commodities  (50,116) (44,808) (64,746)  (49,001) (62,359) (114,496) 
Services (34,670) (31,030)  (44,598)  (33,838) (43,031) (79,013) 
Shelter   (331)  (271) (862)  (411)  (611) (1,097) 
Health care (37,052) (38,726)  (19,085)  (26,942) (29,459)  (54,677) 
Education (24,036) (22,065)  (26,422)  (22,251) (27,476)  (50,641) 
Other items (52,635) (49,115)  (57,930)  (48,118) (59,573)  (109,566) 
Total  $(203,022)  $(189,443)  $(223,443) $(185,599) $(229,783)  $ (422,611) 
       
Reduction in 
expenditures per $1,000 
raised 
      
Food at home $  11  $  9 $  26  $  14  $  17  $18  
Other commodities  127  122  169  136 144              141  
Services 88  85 116  94 99              97  
Shelter  1  1  2 1  1                  1  
Health care 94  106  50  75 68                67  
Education 61  60  69  62  63               62  
Other items 133 134 151 134 138             134  
Total $  513  $  518   $   646   $   517   $   530  $519  
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Distribution of Impacts of Increases in Excise Taxes 
on Alcohol, Tobacco, and Petroleum Fuels 
Alaska already levies excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and petroleum 
fuels. Broad-based sales taxes would be in addition to the excise taxes currently on the books. 
Increases in the excise taxes on these products represent a viable option for increasing state 
revenues. These products are included in the goods category, and any increase in the excise tax 
rates would have similar effects on the economy—through changes in expenditures—as general 
sales taxes, per dollar of revenue raised. However, the distribution of the effects on household 
disposable income of changes in excise taxes on these commodities likely differs from the 
distribution of effects of general sales taxes. 
 
Current tax rates on alcohol are based on a rate of $0.10 per drink, which translates to $1.07 per 
gallon for beer, $2.50 per gallon for wine, and $12.80 per gallon for hard liquor. Small breweries 
get a substantial tax reduction. The alcohol tax raises about $38 million per year, of which $19 
million comes from liquor sales, $6 million from wine, and the remainder from beer. Although 
no solid data exist for Alaska, the tax is likely quite regressive. The CES does include alcoholic 
beverages as a subcategory of expenditures. Expenditure equations estimated for the Alaska CES 
sample, shown in Appendix Table B-7, indicate that the income elasticity of alcohol 
expenditures is greater than 1.0. This suggests that higher income households spend a greater 
proportion of their income on alcohol than lower income households. The difference is likely 
related to how higher income households purchase the product. More affluent households would 
be much more likely to purchase alcohol in restaurants, for example, where the retail price is 
much higher per drink than in liquor stores. 
 
Alaska taxes motor fuels at a rate of $0.0895, marine fuels at $0.05 per gallon, aviation gasoline 
at $0.047 and jet fuel at $0.032 per gallon. The highway rate includes a surcharge of 0.95 cents 
per gallon, effective July 1, 2015. Commercial enterprises pay a substantial portion of motor fuel 
taxes. The CES includes gasoline and motor oil as a subcategory of expenditures, which provides 
some data on how expenditures on gasoline vary with income. Expenditure equations estimated 
for motor fuels from the Alaska CES sample, shown in Appendix Table B-8, indicate that the 
income elasticity of fuel expenditures is approximately 1.0. This suggests that fuel expenditures 
are roughly proportional to per-capita household income. In Alaska at least, it does not appear 
that gasoline taxes would place a higher burden on low-income households. 
 
In fiscal year 2015, the state collected $42 million from fuel taxes, and will likely collect $45 
million in 2016 with the surcharge. Even with the surcharge, Alaska fuel taxes are the lowest in 
the nation. According to the American Petroleum Institute, national average tax rates are 20.91 
on gasoline and 20.17 on diesel. Counting all other taxes and fees, including local sales taxes, 
total Alaska taxes average 12.25 cents for gasoline and 12.75 cents for diesel. National averages 
(including all other taxes and fees) are 30.28 for gasoline and 30.00 for diesel (American 
Petroleum Institute, State Motor Fuel Taxes by State, 
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Statistics/StateMotorFuel-OnePagers-January-2016.pdf). An 
increase of 17.5 cents per gallon, with a similar percentage rise in marine and aviation fuels, 
would raise Alaska rates to the national average and provide an estimated $87 million per year of 
additional revenue. One could consider fuel taxes as a user fee to allow the state to recover its 
cost of operating, maintaining, and upgrading state highways, harbors, and airports. The current 
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state budget for the portion of the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities 
dealing with transportation facilities exceeds $200 million. Even if Alaska raised fuel taxes to the 
national average rates, the total fuel taxes paid of $133 million would still fall far short of what it 
actually costs to maintain Alaska's transportation infrastructure, let alone the state's share of new 
highway construction and port expansion. 
 
Figure A-6 illustrates the distribution of the tax burden among households of varying per-capita 
income for potential increases in alcohol and fuel taxes. The figure measures the distribution of 
effects as the percentage of income lost per $100 million raised, the same benchmark as used for 
the broad-based revenue measures in Figure A-3. The alcohol tax considered is an “ad valorem” 
tax—a constant percentage of the retail price—rather than a constant amount per drink. The CES 
data suggest that an ad valorem alcohol tax would be quite progressive, while motor fuel taxes 
are relatively neutral with respect to income class.  
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Figure A-6 
 
 
Alaska levies tobacco taxes at a rate based on a tax of $2.00 per pack of cigarettes. Revenues 
from tobacco taxes were $65 million in 2015. The amount collected has been declining in recent 
years. The data from the Alaska sample of the CES indicate that only one in five Alaska 
households reported expenditures on tobacco products. The sample is too small to estimate an 
expenditure relationship reliably, but the data do indicate that the amount households do spend 
on tobacco purchases is not correlated with income. The downward trend of tax collections is 
partly due to the decline in tobacco use, but is also likely related to increased Internet sales and 
other means that evade Alaska’s relatively high tax. Because raising tobacco taxes would only 
increase the incentive for tobacco users to find ways to avoid the tax, raising tax rates would not 
necessarily increase state revenues collected. This problem, coupled with the fact that tobacco 
taxes are highly regressive, would recommend against increases in tobacco taxes as a measure to 
reduce the state budget deficit. 
 
Comparison with Other Studies of Revenue Impacts 
The Alaska Department of Revenue (DOR) has developed a fiscal model that estimates revenues 
different revenue options would raise. The model and revenue estimates for a number of revenue 
measures are summarized in “Potential Fiscal and Revenue Options for the Walker-Mallott 
Administration,” Alaska Department of Revenue White Paper, 6/4/2015 
(http://gov.alaska.gov/Walker_media/documents/20150605_potential-fiscal-and-revenue-
Percentage Loss of Disposable Income per Person per $100 Million 
Revenue Raised, by Income Category: Alcohol and Fuel Taxes
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options.pdf). Two of the options investigated by the Department of Revenue—a reduction in 
Permanent Fund dividend payments and an income tax based on a state surcharge on federal 
individual income tax liabilities—are similar to the PFD and income tax surcharge proposals 
studied in this report. The estimates for the amount of revenue raised from these two measure 
presented here correspond closely to the DOR revenue estimates.  
The DOR report also presents revenue estimates for a six-percent state sales tax. DOR estimated 
that a 3 percent sales tax would raise $418 million if food were included and $358 million if food 
were excluded. The tax excluding food corresponds closely to our estimate of $359 million 
(Table A-3). Our estimate of $431 million is somewhat higher than the DOR estimate, but the tax 
base is also broader as it includes rent and utilities as well as food. The two studies, therefore, 
appear to estimate comparable revenues from sales taxes; however, it is difficult to compare the 
estimates without knowing the details about just what types of expenditures the DOR study 
included in the sales tax base.  
A 1993 ISER study examined a number of options for raising state revenues and cutting 
spending, providing estimates of the distribution of effects that parallel those in the current study 
(Alexandra Hill and Matthew Berman, "Gaining and Losing Under State Fiscal Policies," ISER 
Fiscal Policy Papers, Number 8, December 1993, 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/formal/fppapers/fpp8.pdf). The methods of the 
previous analysis were generally similar to those of the current study. The previous study 
estimated sales tax receipts and distribution using national expenditure data and assuming Alaska 
household expenditures had a similar distribution in relation to income as national expenditures. 
The 1993 study relied on 1990 census data to develop the distribution of income and 
demographic profile of Alaska households. 
In 1993, the study estimated that the PFD and  a state longevity bonus (a payment of up to $250 
per month to older Alaskans) accounted for 25 percent of household income of the poorest ten 
percent of households. Although the longevity bonus has since been eliminated, the data in Table 
A-1 suggest that the PFD alone accounted for at least one fourth of income for the poorest 10 
percent of households in 2013, and considerably more in 2015, when the PFD was substantially 
larger.  
The state personal income tax in effect before 1990 was much more progressive than the current 
federal income tax structure, so that analysis had the richest 10 percent of households paying 3.1 
percent of their income in tax, while we estimated that the 10 percent surcharge on federal taxes 
would reduce disposable income of the richest 10 percent by only about half that amount. At the 
upper end of the income distribution, the PFD provided a much higher share of income in 1993 
than it does today. This reflects the rising income inequality in the United States over the past 
two decades, a trend that has also occurred in Alaska. 
In addition to examining effects of income and sales taxes and PFD cuts on households at 
different points along the income distribution, the 1993 study also analyzed the regional effect of 
reductions in state and local government employment. Although the scope of the current study 
does not include the distributional effects of state spending cuts, the previous study’s conclusion 
that rural Alaska communities were much more vulnerable to state budget cuts than urban areas 
undoubtedly still holds.  
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APPENDIX B. 
EXPENDITURE EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FROM THE  
CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY 
 
As discussed in Appendix A, we used Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data to predict how 
much a family would spend on various categories of goods and services as a function of per-
capita income and the number of people in the consumer unit (household size). We estimated 
both linear and loglinear relationships. We estimated the equations as censored regressions, to 
address the fact that expenditures could not be negative. The loglinear specifications generally 
provided a better fit to the data, except in the case of education expenditures, for which the linear 
censored regression provided a more realistic prediction—probably due to the fact that relatively 
few households had education expenditures. We used these equations to estimate the tax base for 
sales taxes, as well as the effect of various revenue measures on expenditures. Tables B-1 
through B-8 display the complete statistical results of the equations. 
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Table B-1. Food at Home 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 56.31 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 
Log likelihood  -364.9 Pseudo R2       = 0.072 
 
Log of food at home Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 0.189 0.060 3.14 0.002 0.071 0.307 
Log of household size 0.713 0.093 7.70 0.000 0.531 0.896 
Constant 5.552 0.648 8.57 0.000 4.277 6.827 
       
Sigma 0.814 0.035   0.746 0.882 
 
Obs. summary: 2  left-censored observations at log food at home = 0 
 277  uncensored observations 
 
 
 
Table B-2. Goods 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 84.66 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 
Log likelihood  -496.8 Pseudo R2       = 0.079 
 
Log of goods excluding food 
at home + 1 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 0.819 0.097 8.46 0.000 0.628 1.010 
Log of household size 0.995 0.149 6.67 0.000 0.702 1.289 
Constant -0.680 1.043 -0.65 0.515 -2.733 1.373 
       
Sigma 1.310 0.056   1.199 1.421 
 
Obs. summary: 4  left-censored observations at log goods = 0 
 275  uncensored observations 
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Table B-3. Services 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 120.6 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 
Log likelihood  -434.8 Pseudo R2       = 0.122 
 
Log of services + 1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 0.820 0.078 10.54 0.000 0.666 0.973 
Log of household size 0.972 0.120 8.11 0.000 0.736 1.207 
Constant -0.828 0.837 -0.99 0.324 -2.477 0.820 
       
Sigma 1.052 0.045   0.964 1.140 
 
Obs. summary: 2  left-censored observations at log services = 0 
 277  uncensored observations 
 
 
 
Table B-4. Shelter 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 0.75 
  Prob > chi2 0.687 
Log likelihood  -445.1 Pseudo R2       = 0.001 
 
Log of rent plus utilities and 
home maintenance + 1 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 0.009 0.080 0.12 0.907 -0.149 0.168 
Log of household size 0.107 0.124 0.87 0.387 -0.136 0.351 
Constant 8.128 0.865 9.39 0.000 6..424 9..831 
       
Sigma 1.087 0.047   0.996 1.179 
 
Obs. summary: 3  left-censored observations at log shelter = 0 
 276  uncensored observations 
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Table B-5. Health Care 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 64.32 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 
Log likelihood  -649.5 Pseudo R2       = 0.047 
 
Log of health care + 1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 2.180 0.273 7.97 0.000 1.642 2.718 
Log of household size 1.405 0.405 3.46 0.001 0.607 2.203 
Constant -18.22 2.965 -6.14 0.000 -24.05 -12.38 
       
Sigma 3.445 1.777   3.096 3.795 
 
Obs. summary: 64  left-censored observations at log of health care = 0 
 215  uncensored observations 
 
 
 
Table B-.6. Education 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 11.55 
  Prob > chi2 0.003 
Log likelihood  -683.9 Pseudo R2       = 0.008 
 
Education Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Per-capita HH income 0.0704 0.0354 1.99 0.048 0.001 0.140 
Household size 3369 1101 3.06 0.002 1201 5537 
Constant -26854 4960 -5.41 0.000 -36618 -17090 
       
Sigma 17251 1755   13795 20707 
 
Obs. summary: 225  left-censored observations at education = 0 
 54  uncensored observations 
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Table B-7. Alcoholic Beverages  
(Subcategory of Goods) 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 54.72 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 
Log likelihood  -570.0 Pseudo R2       = 0.046 
 
Log of alcoholic beverages + 
1 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 2.384 0.332 7.18 0.000 1.730 3.037 
Log of household size 1.575 0.492 3.20 0.002 0.605 2.544 
Constant -23.19 3.620 -6.41 0.000 -30.32 -16.07 
       
Sigma 4.012 0.244   3.532 4.492 
 
Obs. summary: 111  left-censored observations at education = 0 
 168  uncensored observations 
 
 
 
Table B-8. Gasoline and Motor Oil 
(Subcategory of Goods) 
 
 
Tobit regression  Number of observations 279 
  Likelihood Ratio chi2(2) 109.1 
  Prob > chi2 0.000 
Log likelihood  -552.2 Pseudo R2       = 0.090 
 
Log of gas and oil + 1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Log of per-capita HH income 1.146 0.123 9.30 0.000 0.903 1.388 
Log of household size 1.557 0.189 8.25 0.000 1.186 1.928 
Constant -6.325 1.329 -4.76 0.000 -9.406 -3.710 
       
Sigma 1.648 0.074   1.503 1.793 
 
Obs. summary: 17  left-censored observations at education = 0 
 262  uncensored observations 
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APPENDIX C. 
IMPLAN MODEL 
To estimate short-run economic impacts, we used the IMPLAN input-output model.  This 
appendix provides a brief overview of input-output modeling and the IMPLAN model.  
Appendix D provides details of how we used the IMPLAN model for this analysis. 
 
Input-Output Modeling 
An input-output model is a representation of the flows of economic activity between sectors 
within a region. The model captures what each business or sector must purchase from every 
other sector in order to produce a dollar’s worth of goods or services. Using an input-output 
model, we can trace flows of economic activity associated with any change in spending either 
forwards (spending generating income, which induces further spending) or backwards (industry 
purchases of fuel that lead refineries to purchase additional inputs – crude oil, utilities, etc.).  
Below is a brief summary of some of the most important terms used in input-output analysis.    
 
Final demand is the term for sales to final consumers (households or government). Sales 
between industries are termed intermediate sales. Economic impact analysis generally estimates 
the regional economic impacts of final demand changes. Household spending is one type of final 
demand.  
 
Direct effects are the changes in economic activity during the first round of spending. For 
transportation services, this involves the impacts on the transportation industries (businesses 
selling directly to purchasers) themselves.  
 
Secondary effects are the changes in economic activity from subsequent rounds of re-spending 
of transportation dollars. There are two types of secondary effects: 
• Indirect effects are the changes in sales, income, or employment within the region in 
backward-linked industries supplying goods and services to transportation businesses. 
Increased sales in truck-tire supply firms resulting from more shipping services sales are an 
indirect effect of transportation spending. 
• Induced effects are the increased sales within the region from household spending of the 
income earned in transportation services and supporting industries. Employees in 
transportation services and supporting industries spend the income they earn on housing, 
utilities, groceries, and other consumer goods and services. This generates sales, income and 
employment throughout the region’s economy.  
 
Total effects are the sum of direct, indirect, and induced effects. Multipliers capture the size of 
the secondary effects in a given region, generally as a ratio of the total change in economic 
activity in the region relative to the direct change. Multipliers may be expressed as ratios of 
sales, income or employment, or as ratios of total income or employment changes relative to 
direct sales. 
 
Multipliers express the degree of interdependency between sectors in a region’s economy and 
therefore vary considerably across regions and sectors. Type I multipliers measure the direct and 
indirect effects of a change in economic activity. Unlike Type II or SAM multipliers (discussed 
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below), they do not include induced effects. They capture the inter-industry effects only—i.e., 
industries buying from local industries.  
 
IMPLAN Model 
To estimate short-run economic impacts, we used the proprietary IMPLAN input-output model 
(http://www.implan.com/). The most important component of IMPLAN is an input-output dollar 
flow table. For a specified region, the input-output table accounts for all dollar flows between 
different sectors of the economy. Using this information, IMPLAN models the way a dollar 
injected into one sector is spent and re-spent in other sectors of the economy, generating waves 
of economic activity, or so-called “economic multiplier” effects. The model uses national 
industry data and county-level economic data to generate a series of multipliers, which in turn 
estimate the total economic implications of economic activity.  The inclusion of the Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) allows the measurement of economic relationships between 
government, industry, and household sectors, allowing IMPLAN to model transfer payments, 
such as unemployment insurance. 
 
We used the IMPLAN1 software version (3.1), which contains 2013 data, for our analysis. This 
model contains 299 industries, and 9 income group categories for the state of Alaska.   Table C-1 
(on the following page) provides summary data for the Alaska model. 
 
IMPLAN Data Sources 
The input-output model generated by IMPLAN requires data from multiple sources. Below we 
describe the most important sources of data. 
 
Employment 
In general, Covered Employment and Wages (CEW)2 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
provide the county-level industry structure for the IMPLAN database. The U.S. Census Bureau’s 
County Business Patterns (CBP) data are used to estimate non-disclosed values, while the 
regional economic (REA)3 data is used for control totals (to incorporate proprietors and non-
covered sectors4).   
 
Employee compensation describes the total payroll costs (including benefits) of each industry in 
the region. It includes the wages and salaries of workers who are paid by employers, as well as 
benefits such as health and life insurance, retirement payments, and non-cash compensation. 
Employee compensation is derived for each industry from ES2025 and Regional Economic 
Information System Employment (REIS) data. 
                                                
1 See the Glossary of Terms below and IMPLAN overview here: 
http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/documentcenter/home/view/6474 
 
2 Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cew/apps/data_views/data_views.htm#tab=Tables 
3Bureau of Economic Analysis: http://www.bea.gov/regional/ 
4 Since these data only capture covered employees, the data set cannot capture self-employed persons, railway employment, religious 
organizations, military, elected officials or any other establishments that have their own social insurance program and/or do not pay into the 
Unemployment Insurance program.  Since most farm employment is self-employment, CEW data miss much of the farm data.   
5 Employment and Wage (ES-202) data are derived from reports filed by all employers subject to unemployment compensation laws, both state 
and federal. Industry employment and payroll information is produced both quarterly and annually for the state, labor market areas, workforce 
investment areas, cities and towns, and counties. NAICS based employment and wage data are available beginning with the first quarter of 2001. 
Use the query tool below to obtain Employment and Wage data by area and industry. http://lmi2.detma.org/lmi/lmi_es_a.asp 
 
C-3 
 
 
Table C-1. Overview of IMPLAN 
Model Year 2013 
GRP (Gross Regional Product) 
 
$64,776,426,833 
Total Personal Income $36,779,760,000 
Total Employment 488,575 
Number of Industries 299 
Population 735,132 
Total Households 262,327 
Average Household Income $140,206 
Value Added 
 Employee Compensation $28,376,414,336 
Proprietor Income $3,874,819,622 
Other Property Type Income $24,512,101,981 
Tax on Production and Import $8,013,090,894 
Total Value Added $64,776,426,833 
Final Demand 
 Households 
 
28,629,722,314 
State/Local Government $9,936,276,378 
Federal Government $10,243,953,265 
Capital 
 
$8,388,415,723 
Exports 
 
$41,848,452,645 
Imports 
 
-$32,411,848,922 
Institutional Sales -$1,858,544,524 
Total Final Demand: $64,776,426,879 
 
Households 
National household Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) are estimated using the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) Benchmark I-O-to-PCE bridge tables and current National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) PCE data.  National PCE are distributed to states and counties 
based on the number of households and household income for each of the nine income 
categories. The spending patterns for each of the nine household income categories were created 
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
 
Household income is based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) “Personal Income” 
numbers reported by the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) in the CA5 tables – 
Personal Income and controlled to current BEA National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
for the nation.  
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Government 
Federal sales and expenditures data are estimated using NIPA control totals and the Benchmark 
I-O distribution, with the exception of the timber sales data, which are from the U.S. Forest 
Service.  Data for State and Local Government sales are obtained from the current Annual 
Survey of Governments: Finances data series, while State and Local Government expenditures 
are estimated using NIPA control totals and the Benchmark I-O distribution. 
 
Social Accounting Matrix 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) accounts are an extension of traditional input-output accounts. 
Like input-output analysis, a full social accounting matrix is a double-entry bookkeeping system 
capable of tracing monetary flows through debits and credits similar to T-Accounts in basic 
financial accounting. The matrix format allows the double-entry bookkeeping to be displayed in 
a single entry format. The column entries represent expenditures (payments) made by the 
economic agents. The row entries represent receipts or income to agents. By accounting 
definition, all receipts must equal all expenditures. A SAM with complete accounting of flows 
actually serves as a check for IMPLAN data, since a SAM gives a complete picture of taxation 
and savings for households and governments. 
 
The U.S. SAM data come directly from the National Income and Product Accounts. State and 
county SAM data is derived from a number of sources. The IMPLAN data contribute a large 
portion of the local area data. All inter-industry information is derived from the MIG IMPLAN 
databases. IMPLAN gives the SAM the use and make tables, the factor receipts, and the 
commodities purchased by institutions. Other SAM elements are derived from a variety of 
sources. 
 
Estimates of household income and expenditure transfers come from four primary sources. The 
first is the IMPLAN industry data. The second is the BEA Regional Economic Information 
System (REIS) CA 35 Table. The third is the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), and the 
fourth is the Annual Survey of Government Finances. Household income received from 
industries is from the IMPLAN data. This income is by place of work, and is income received by 
individuals where they perform the work. Social accounting data is by definition place-of-
residence. The REIS data provides the residency adjustment. 
 
Household income is adjusted for place-of-residence so it is consistent with other sources of 
household income. Residence-based household income is derived from REIS data. REIS has 
estimates of income by place of work and place of residence, as well as some transfer-payment 
data. Household expenditures on federal taxes are from the CES data, distributed to states and 
counties on the basis of the area’s demographic makeup. 
 
D-1 
 
APPENDIX D. 
ESTIMATION OF SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
This appendix provides technical documentation for our estimation of short-term economic 
impacts of the fiscal options we analyzed. 
 
As discussed in Chapter II and Appendix A, we analyzed two scenarios for how fiscal options 
might affect household spending, based on different assumptions estimated from different data 
sources.  We refer to these as the “high” scenario (based on assumptions embedded in the 
IMPLAN model) and the “low” scenario (based on assumptions estimated from census income 
data).  All the direct economic impacts are the same for the low scenario as for the high.  The 
differences are in the multiplier economic impacts, because they are based on different 
assumptions about how changes in household income would affect household spending.  The 
high-scenario assumptions generally result in higher estimated impacts of the fiscal options on 
Alaska household spending, and correspondingly higher multiplier economic impacts, than the 
low-scenario option.   
 
High-Scenario Estimates of Economic Impacts 
In this appendix, we first discuss the estimated impacts for the high scenario.  The following 
analysis and discussion—and including the tables through Table D-12—are all about the high 
scenario, until we conclude with the section “Low Scenarios for Economic Impacts.” 
 
IMPLAN Model Assumptions for Spending Cut Options 
Spending Cut:  Workers 
We modeled the impacts of removing1,300 jobs from the sector named employment and payroll 
of state government employment (IMPLAN sector number 531).  This sector consists of workers 
typically employed in Parks & Recreation, Health, Hospitals, Police, Judicial and Legal, 
Financial Administrative, Highways, Public Welfare, Fire Protection, Natural Resources, 
Corrections, Libraries, and Social Insurance.  These jobs are associated with a total output of 
$135,162,159 in output and total labor income of $128,443,783. 
 
Spending Cut:  Broad-Based 
We modeled the impacts of removing $100 million from the spending of a sector named other 
state government enterprises.  This sector consists of Sewerage, Water Supply, Gas Supply, 
Airports, Water trans. and terminals, and Housing and Community Development. 
 
Spending Cut: Capital 
We modeled the impacts of reducing spending by $60 million in a sector named construction in 
new commercial structures and reducing spending by $40 million in a sector named construction 
in other non-residential structures.  We used this weighted average of spending reductions for 
two sectors to reflect the fact that the labor intensity of different types of capital spending differs.   
 
  
D-2 
 
Spending Cut: Pay 
We modeled the impacts of a $100 million decrease in employee compensation.  We modeled 
those similarly to how we modeled the impacts of taxes and dividend cuts, described below.  The 
impacts are driven by assumed changes in spending resulting from the decrease in employee 
compensation, after adjusting for payroll taxes, social insurance taxes, personal taxes and 
savings. 
 
IMPLAN Model Assumptions for Tax and Dividend Cut Options 
To develop IMPLAN model assumptions for the income tax, sales tax, and dividend cut fiscal 
options, we used the methodology discussed in Appendix A to derive the following estimates of 
total income raised by each fiscal option, by residency.  Note that these are the same estimates as 
those shown in Appendix A, Table A-3. 
 
Table D-1 
 
 
We also used the methodology discussed in Appendix A to develop the following estimates of 
revenue  that would be raised from Alaska residents, by income group. 
 
Table D-2 
 
 
Note that the totals for revenues raised from residents vary between Tables D-1 and D-2 for the 
income tax and the dividend cut options, particularly for the progressive (10% federal income tax 
surcharge) option.  The income tax is non-linear because of the progressive rates. The IRS data 
has enough information to enable us to estimate the total taxes collected. The average household 
Fiscal option
10% federal 
income tax 
surcharge
2% flat rate 
income tax
4 % sales tax 
excluding food at 
home, shelter, 
health care & 
education
3% sales tax 
excluding health 
care & education
20 mil (2%) 
property tax 
with local credit $600 cut in PFD
Residents $338,847 $366,442 $317,970 $388,218 $716,071 $380,019
Non-residents $27,033 $29,234 $41,198 $44,975 $98,572 $3,800
Total $365,880 $395,676 $359,168 $433,193 $814,642 $383,819
Resident share 92.6% 92.6% 88.5% 89.6% 87.9% 99.0%
Non-resident share 7.4% 7.4% 11.5% 10.4% 12.1% 1.0%
Income group
10% federal 
income tax 
surcharge
2% flat rate 
income tax
4 % sales tax 
excluding food at 
home, shelter, 
health care 
&education
3% sales tax 
excluding health 
care & education
20 mil (2%) 
property tax 
with local credit $600 cut in PFD
lowest 10 percent $976 $1,888 $7,626 $19,706 $34,264 $44,895
10-20 percent $3,108 $5,520 $16,439 $27,411 $44,960 $46,265
20-30 percent $5,843 $9,594 $18,889 $28,661 $48,344 $39,236
30-40 percent $11,940 $18,232 $25,751 $34,847 $66,999 $43,552
40-50 percent $18,625 $25,480 $31,284 $39,082 $73,980 $43,900
50-60 percent $25,808 $32,938 $34,663 $41,560 $78,052 $40,340
60-70 percent $28,427 $35,777 $35,202 $41,521 $80,219 $34,740
70-80 percent $36,652 $43,038 $40,368 $45,248 $87,247 $32,880
80-90 percent $48,862 $51,275 $44,450 $48,089 $88,851 $29,559
highest 10 percent $106,255 $88,335 $63,299 $62,092 $113,156 $24,650
Total $338,847 $366,442 $317,970 $388,218 $716,071 $380,019
Estimated Revenue Raised from Residents, by Income Group ($000)
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per-capita income in the percentiles is not the same as for the IRS distribution of taxpayers, and 
there is no way to adjust for this perfectly. That is why the average amounts collected per decile 
don't exactly add to the total.  The total is more accurate. With sales taxes, there is neither the 
progressive structure nor the ability to estimate the total tax, so we used the weighted average of 
the percentiles to estimate the total, which is why the total does equal the sum. 
 
From Table D-2, we calculated the shares of revenues raised from residents by income group. 
 
Table D-3 
 
 
For our IMPLAN model assumptions, we needed to estimate the changes in expenditures that 
would result from collecting the total revenues shown in Table D-1.  We had no data on the 
distribution of income of the non-residents from whom revenues would be collected.  We 
therefore assumed that the shares of different income groups would be the same for total revenue 
collections (and therefore implicitly for non-resident revenue collections) as the shares for 
resident revenue collections shown in Table D-3 above. 
 
  
Fiscal option
10% federal 
income tax 
surcharge
2% flat rate 
income tax
4 % sales tax 
excluding food at 
home, shelter, 
health care 
&education
3% sales tax 
excluding health 
care & education
20 mil (2%) 
property tax 
with local credit $600 cut in PFD
lowest 10 percent 0.34% 0.60% 2.40% 5.08% 4.78% 11.81%
10-20 percent 1.08% 1.77% 5.17% 7.06% 6.28% 12.17%
20-30 percent 2.04% 3.07% 5.94% 7.38% 6.75% 10.32%
30-40 percent 4.17% 5.84% 8.10% 8.98% 9.36% 11.46%
40-50 percent 6.50% 8.16% 9.84% 10.07% 10.33% 11.55%
50-60 percent 9.01% 10.55% 10.90% 10.71% 10.90% 10.62%
60-70 percent 9.92% 11.46% 11.07% 10.70% 11.20% 9.14%
70-80 percent 12.79% 13.79% 12.70% 11.66% 12.18% 8.65%
80-90 percent 17.06% 16.43% 13.98% 12.39% 12.41% 7.78%
highest 10 percent 37.09% 28.31% 19.91% 15.99% 15.80% 6.49%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Estimated Share of Revenue Raised from Residents, by Income Group (%)
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We then estimated the total revenue collections by income group (from residents and non-
residents combined), shown in Table D-4, by multiplying the income group shares in Table D-3 
by the total revenue collections shown in the bottom row of Table D-1. 
 
Table D-4 
 
 
 
We then estimated spending reductions per dollar of lost income.   
 
Table D-5 
 
 
 
 
We derived these by assuming that the share of a dollar of income that is spent is the share that is 
not devoted to savings or taxes.  Put differently, a dollar reduction in income results in spending 
reductions equal to 1 minus (savings + taxes).   
 
To derive how much each income group allocates to taxes and savings, we did the following.  To 
generate flows from households to government (taxes), we divided distributions from each 
Income group
10% federal 
income tax 
surcharge
2% flat rate 
income tax
4 % sales tax 
excluding food at 
home, shelter, 
health care 
&education
3% sales tax 
excluding health 
care & education
20 mil (2%) 
property tax 
with local credit $600 cut in PFD
lowest 10 percent $1,246 $2,393 $8,614 $21,989 $38,980 $45,344
10-20 percent $3,970 $6,999 $18,569 $30,586 $51,149 $46,728
20-30 percent $7,463 $12,164 $21,336 $31,982 $54,998 $39,629
30-40 percent $15,249 $23,116 $29,087 $38,884 $76,222 $43,988
40-50 percent $23,786 $32,305 $35,337 $43,610 $84,163 $44,339
50-60 percent $32,958 $41,761 $39,154 $46,375 $88,797 $40,743
60-70 percent $36,303 $45,361 $39,763 $46,331 $91,262 $35,088
70-80 percent $46,808 $54,567 $45,598 $50,490 $99,257 $33,209
80-90 percent $62,401 $65,011 $50,209 $53,661 $101,082 $29,854
highest 10 percent $135,696 $111,999 $71,501 $69,285 $128,733 $24,896
Total $365,880 $395,676 $359,168 $433,193 $814,642 $383,819
Assumed Total Revenue Raised by Income Group:   Income Tax, Sales Tax and Dividend Cut Options ($000)
Income Group Reduction
lowest 10 percent $1.00
10-20 percent $1.00
20-30 percent $1.00
30-40 percent $1.00
40-50 percent $1.00
50-60 percent $1.00
60-70 percent $0.95
70-80 percent $0.88
80-90 percent $0.71
highest 10 percent $0.51
Assumed Spending Reduction
Per Dollar of Lost Income
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income group to government (Federal Government Non-Defense (code 11001)), (State/Local 
Gov’t non-education, and 12001)) by the overall spending (Total).  To generate how much 
households are allocating to their savings, we divided the amount they allocate to capital (14001) 
by the overall income (Total).  
 
Lower-income households receive distributions from the government that become part of their 
overall incomes. For these income groups, a dollar income reduction is assumed to lead to a 
dollar in spending reductions.    
 
We multiplied the estimates of total revenues collected by group in Table D-4 by the assumed 
spending reductions per dollar of lost income in Table D-5 to estimate the assumed expenditure 
reductions by income group shown in Table D-6. 
 
Table D-6 
 
 
High Scenario
Income group
10% federal 
income tax 
surcharge
2% flat rate 
income tax
4 % sales tax 
excluding food at 
home, shelter, 
health care 
&education
3% sales tax 
excluding health 
care & education
20 mil (2%) 
property tax 
with local credit $600 cut in PFD
lowest 10 percent $1,246.27 $2,393 $8,614 $21,989 $38,980 $45,344
10-20 percent $3,970 $6,999 $18,569 $30,586 $51,149 $46,728
20-30 percent $7,463 $12,164 $21,336 $31,982 $54,998 $39,629
30-40 percent $15,249 $23,116 $29,087 $38,884 $76,222 $43,988
40-50 percent $23,786 $32,305 $35,337 $43,610 $84,163 $44,339
50-60 percent $32,958 $41,761 $39,154 $46,375 $88,797 $40,743
60-70 percent $34,488 $43,093 $37,775 $44,015 $86,699 $33,334
70-80 percent $41,191 $48,019 $40,127 $44,431 $87,346 $29,224
80-90 percent $44,305 $46,158 $35,648 $38,099 $71,768 $21,197
highest 10 percent $69,205 $57,119 $36,465 $35,336 $65,654 $12,697
Total $273,861 $313,127 $302,112 $375,306 $705,776 $357,223
Assumed Expenditure Reduction by Income Group:   Income Tax, Sales Tax and Dividend Cut Options ($000):
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IMPLAN Estimates for Fiscal Options 
To save space in the following tables, and also to simplify the tables in other parts of this report, 
in the remainder of this appendix and in other parts of this report we use the following “short 
names” (Table D-7) for the fiscal options we analyzed. 
 
Table D-7 
 
 
Table D-8 summarizes our IMPLAN estimates of the direct, indirect, induced and total impacts 
under each fiscal option on employment, labor income, total value added, and output, using the 
high scenario assumptions for expenditures. Note that these are estimated impacts before 
adjusting for $100 million of deficit reduction, to facilitate comparison of the relative economic 
impacts of different options, and before adjusting for the shares of tax and dividend-cut income 
reductions experienced by Alaska residents.  Put differently, the estimates show what the total 
estimated economic impacts would be if we assumed that the impacts of the tax and dividend 
options were the same as if all revenues were collected from Alaska residents.  
 
Full name Short name
Used in Appendix A
and earlier parts of Appendix D
Used in Executive Summary
and report chapters 
Spending cut: workers Spending cut: workers
Spending cut: broad-based Spending cut: broad-based
Spending cut: capital Spending cut: capital
Spending cut: pay Spending cut: pay
10% federal income tax surcharge Income tax: progressive
2%  flat rate income tax Income tax: flat rate
4% sales tax excluding food at home, shelter, health care & education Sales tax: more exclusions
3% sales tax excluding health care & education Sales tax: fewer exclusions
20 mil (2%) property tax with local credit Property tax
$600 cut in PFD Dividend cut
Saving less Saving less
Fiscal Option Names
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Table D-8 
 
 
Table D-9 shows the corresponding estimates of the direct, indirect, induced and total impacts of 
each fiscal option, after adjusting for $100 million of deficit reduction, to facilitate comparison 
of the relative economic impacts of different options. Note that, as with Table D-8, these 
estimates are not adjusted for the shares of tax and dividend cut income reductions experienced 
by Alaska residents.  Put differently, they show the estimated economic impacts per $100 million 
of deficit reduction, if we assume the impacts of the tax and dividend options were the same as if 
all revenues were collected from Alaska residents. 
 
Fiscal Option Impact Employment Labor Income Total Value Added Output
Direct Impact 1,300 $128,443,783 $135,162,163 $135,162,159
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 967 $57,834,399 $91,080,286 $140,242,201
Total Impact 2,267 $186,278,182 $226,242,449 $275,404,360
Direct Impact 504 $67,465,139 $64,180,716 $99,999,998
Indirect Impact 165 $12,590,276 $18,075,711 $32,541,789
Induced Impact 589 $35,095,126 $55,496,950 $85,651,702
Total Impact 1,260 $115,150,542 $137,753,378 $218,193,489
Direct Impact 506 $41,660,828 $48,689,461 $100,000,000
Indirect Impact 159 $10,380,857 $15,531,755 $29,027,814
Induced Impact 266 $11,893,924 $22,463,822 $35,772,456
Total Impact 931 $63,935,610 $86,685,039 $164,800,273
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 727 $43,293,555 $68,379,638 $105,397,277
Total Impact 727 $43,293,555 $68,379,638 $105,397,277
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 3,107 $179,068,073 $288,589,000 $452,448,266
Total Impact 3,107 $179,068,073 $288,589,000 $452,448,266
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 3,409 $195,220,936 $316,654,054 $497,295,126
Total Impact 3,409 $195,220,936 $316,654,054 $497,295,126
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 3,145 $178,782,037 $291,685,082 $459,844,684
Total Impact 3,145 $178,782,037 $291,685,082 $459,844,684
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 3,807 $215,465,761 $352,884,720 $557,074,004
Total Impact 3,807 $215,465,761 $352,884,720 $557,074,004
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 7,160 $405,917,294 $663,662,796 $1,046,740,407
Total Impact 7,160 $405,917,294 $663,662,796 $1,046,740,407
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 3,458 $193,593,641 $320,190,281 $507,127,459
Total Impact 3,458 $193,593,641 $320,190,281 $507,127,459
Spending cut:
pay
10% federal 
income tax 
surcharge
20 mil (2%) 
property tax with 
local credit
Estimated Economic Impacts of Fiscal Options: High Scenario
(Before Adjustments for $100 Million of Deficit Reduction or for Residency)
Spending cut:
workers
Spending cut:
broad-based
Spending cut:
capital
2 percent flat rate 
income tax
4% sales tax excl. 
food, rent, health
3% sales tax excl. 
health, education
$600 cut in PFD
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Table D-9 
 
 
Fiscal Option
Deficit 
reduction
Adjustment 
factor* Impact Employment Labor Income
Total Value 
Added Output
Direct Impact 962 $95,029,396 $100,000,003 $100,000,000
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 715 $42,788,898 $67,385,936 $103,758,479
Total Impact 1,677 $137,818,294 $167,385,939 $203,758,479
Direct Impact 504 $67,465,139 $64,180,716 $99,999,998
Indirect Impact 165 $12,590,276 $18,075,711 $32,541,789
Induced Impact 589 $35,095,126 $55,496,950 $85,651,702
Total Impact 1,260 $115,150,542 $137,753,378 $218,193,489
Direct Impact 506 $41,660,828 $48,689,461 $100,000,000
Indirect Impact 159 $10,380,857 $15,531,755 $29,027,814
Induced Impact 266 $11,893,924 $22,463,822 $35,772,456
Total Impact 931 $63,935,610 $86,685,039 $164,800,273
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 727 $43,293,555 $68,379,638 $105,397,277
Total Impact 727 $43,293,555 $68,379,638 $105,397,277
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 849 $48,941,691 $78,875,221 $123,660,142
Total Impact 849 $48,941,691 $78,875,221 $123,660,142
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 861 $49,338,556 $80,028,577 $125,682,336
Total Impact 861 $49,338,556 $80,028,577 $125,682,336
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 876 $49,776,688 $81,211,276 $128,030,455
Total Impact 876 $49,776,688 $81,211,276 $128,030,455
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 879 $49,738,981 $81,461,325 $128,597,199
Total Impact 879 $49,738,981 $81,461,325 $128,597,199
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 879 $49,827,690 $81,466,803 $128,490,847
Total Impact 879 $49,827,690 $81,466,803 $128,490,847
Direct Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Indirect Impact 0 $0 $0 $0
Induced Impact 901 $50,438,776 $83,422,191 $132,126,696
Total Impact 901 $50,438,776 $83,422,191 $132,126,696
3% sales tax excl. 
health, education $433,192,952 0.2308
20 mil (2%) 
property tax with 
local credit
$814,642,218 0.1228
2 percent flat rate 
income tax $395,676,227 0.2527
* Adjustment factor for the estimates in Table D-8, to convert to estimated economic impacts per $100 million of deficit 
reduction.  Calculated by dividing $100 million by the deficit reduction shown in the second column.
$600 cut in PFD $383,819,073 0.2605
4% sales tax excl. 
food, rent, health $359,168,203 0.2784
Spending cut:
pay $100,000,000 1.0000
10% federal income 
tax surcharge $365,880,435 0.2733
Spending cut:
broad-based $100,000,000 1.0000
Spending cut:
capital $100,000,000 1.0000
Estimated Economic Impacts of Fiscal Options Per $100 Million of Deficit Reduction: High Scenario
(before adjustments for residency)
Spending cut:
workers $135,162,159 0.7399
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Table D-10 summarizes the estimated short-run economic impacts of each fiscal option on 
income and employment, before adjustments for residency.  We use the term “multiplier 
impacts” to refer to the sum of indirect and induced impacts.   
 
Table D-10 
 
 
The direct employment impacts shown for the first three spending cut options are the same as 
those shown in Table D-9: only these three options have direct employment impacts. 
 
The “direct earned income” impacts shown for the first three spending cut options are the same 
as the “direct labor income” impacts shown in Table D-9.   
 
The $100 million impact on “direct other” income for the five tax and dividend-cut options 
shown in the lower half of Table D-10 represents the loss of income from the assumed $100 
million reduction in the deficit (assuming that this was entirely resident income).  Although we 
show a direct earned impact of $100 million for the “spending cut: pay” option, we actually 
estimate the income impacts of this option in the same way as we do for the “direct other” 
income impacts of the tax and dividend cut options—as multiplier impacts resulting from 
expenditure reductions resulting from the lost income.   
 
The multiplier employment and income impacts shown in Table D-10 are the sums of the 
indirect and induced impacts shown in Table D-9.  The total impacts are the sums of the direct 
and multiplier impacts shown in Table D-10. 
 
Note that the bottom row of Table D-10 shows zero short-run economic impacts of “saving less.”  
Saving less means spending some of the annual Permanent Fund realized earnings that currently 
go to the Permanent Fund principal (as inflation proofing) or the Permanent Fund earnings 
reserve (as additions to the earnings reserve).  Although saving less would reduce future growth 
of the Permanent Fund and thus would reduce future earnings, it would not remove any income 
or jobs from the economy in the short-run and would have no short-run economic impacts.   
Direct 
earned
Direct 
other
Multi-
plier Total Direct
Multi-
plier Total
Spending cut: workers 95.0 42.8 137.8 962 715 1677
Spending cut: broad-based 67.5 47.7 115.2 504 754 1260
Spending cut: capital 41.7 22.3 63.9 506 425 931
Spending cut: pay 100.0 43.3 143.3 0 727 727
Income tax: progressive 100.0 48.9 148.9 0 849 849
Income tax: flat rate 100.0 49.3 149.3 0 861 861
Sales tax: more exclusions 100.0 49.8 149.8 0 876 876
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 100.0 49.8 149.8 0 879 879
Property Tax 100.0 49.8 149.8 0 879 879
Dividend cut 100.0 50.4 150.4 0 901 901
Saving less 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
Estimated Short-Run Economic Impacts of Selected Options for Reducing the Deficit by $100 Million:
High Scenario (before adjustments for residency)
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
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Table D-11 shows the assumed share of revenues that would be paid by residents.  These are the 
same shares as shown above in Table D-1. 
 
Table D-11 
 
 
 
Table D-12 summarizes the estimated short-run economic impacts of each fiscal option on 
income and employment, after adjusting for residency by multiplying the impacts shown in 
Table D-10 by the resident shares shown in Table D-11.  We use the term “multiplier impacts” to 
refer to the sum of indirect and induced impacts.  These are the estimates of short-run economic 
impacts we report in the Executive Summary and in Chapter III.   
 
Table D-12 
 
 
 
Option Share
Spending cut: workers 100.0%
Spending cut: broad-based 100.0%
Spending cut: capital 100.0%
Spending cut: pay 100.0%
Income tax: progressive 92.6%
Income tax: flat rate 92.6%
Sales tax: more exclusions 88.5%
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 89.6%
Property tax 87.9%
Dividend cut 99.0%
Saving less NA
Assumed Share of Revenues Paid by Residents
Direct 
earned
Direct 
other
Multi-
plier Total Direct
Multi-
plier Total
Spending cut:  Government workers 95.0 42.8 137.8 962 715 1677
Spending cut: Government enterprise 67.5 47.7 115.2 504 754 1260
Spending cut: Capital spending 41.7 22.3 63.9 506 425 931
Spending cut:  Government pay 100.0 43.3 143.3 0 727 727
Income tax:  share of federal tax 92.6 45.3 137.9 0 786 786
Income tax:  flat rate 92.6 45.7 138.3 0 798 798
Sales tax:  excl. food, rent 88.5 44.1 132.6 0 775 775
Sales tax:  incl. food, rent 89.6 44.7 134.3 0 788 788
Property Tax 87.9 43.8 131.7 0 773 773
Dividend cut 99.0 49.9 148.9 0 892 892
Saving less 0.0 0
Estimated Short-Run Economic Impacts of Selected Options for Reducing the Deficit by $100 Million:
High Scenario (after adjustments for residency)
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
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Note that this residency adjustment implies the assumption that the tax and dividend cut options 
impact the economy only because of their impacts on resident income and expenditures:  impacts 
on non-resident incomes are not assumed to result in any impact on non-resident expenditures in 
Alaska.   
 
Low-Scenario Estimates of Economic Impacts 
As discussed above, we analyzed two scenarios for how fiscal options might affect household 
spending, based on different assumptions estimated from different data sources (high and low 
scenarios). The earlier sections of this appendix discussed the estimated impacts for the high 
scenario.  Here we discuss the estimated impacts under the low scenario. 
 
As we said at the outset, all the direct economic impacts are the same for the low scenario as for 
the high scenario.  The differences are in the multiplier economic impacts.  These differ because 
they incorporate different assumptions about how changes in household income would affect 
household spending. 
 
The top two rows of Table D-13 show the estimated expenditure reductions per thousand dollars 
raised for the low and high scenarios, as reported in Figure II-7.  We use the ratio of the low 
scenario expenditure reductions to the high scenario expenditure reductions as “multiplier 
adjustment factors” for each of the tax and dividend-cut fiscal options.  For the spending cut 
options, we assume a multiplier adjustment factor equal to the average of the multiplier 
adjustment factors for the tax and dividend cut options (63.2%). 
 
Table D-13 
 
 
 
We multiply the estimated economic impacts from Table D-12 by the multiplier adjustment 
factors from Table D-13 to calculate the low scenario economic impact estimates shown in Table 
D-14. 
 
Fiscal option
Income tax: 
progressive
Income tax: 
flat rate
Sales tax: 
more 
exclusions
Sales tax: 
fewer 
exclusions
Property 
tax
Dividend 
cut
Assumed expenditure reductions
per thousand dollars raised
High scenario (based on IMPLAN data) 748 791 841 866 866 931
Low scenario (based on Census data) 518 513 517 530 519 582
Multiplier adjustment factor for low scenario 
economic impact estimates
(= ratio of low scenario expenditure reductions 
to high scenario expenditure reductions)
69.2% 64.8% 61.5% 61.2% 59.9% 62.5%
Calculation of Multiplier Adjustment Factors for Low Scenario Economic Impact Estimates
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Table D-14 
 
 
 
  
Direct 
earned
Direct 
other
Multi-
plier Total Direct
Multi-
plier Total
Spending cut: workers 95.0 27.0 122.1 962 452 1414
Spending cut: broad-based 67.5 30.1 97.6 504 476 980
Spending cut: capital 41.7 14.1 55.7 506 269 775
Spending cut: pay 100.0 27.4 127.4 0 459 459
Income tax: progressive 92.6 31.4 124.0 0 544 544
Income tax: flat rate 92.6 29.6 122.2 0 517 517
Sales tax: more exclusions 88.5 27.1 115.6 0 477 477
Sales tax: fewer exclusions 89.6 27.3 116.9 0 482 482
Property tax 87.9 26.2 114.1 0 463 463
Dividend cut 99.0 31.2 130.2 0 558 558
Saving less 0.0 0
Estimated Short-Run Economic Impacts of Selected Options for Reducing the Deficit by $100 Million:
Low Scenario
Option
Income Impacts
(millions of $ of income)
Employment Impacts
(FTE jobs in Alaska)
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Changes in Estimated Economic Impacts from Earlier Estimates 
In response to requests by the press and legislators, we prepared several sets of estimates of 
short-run economic impacts of selected fiscal options prior to finishing this draft report.  Some of 
these earlier estimates differ from the estimates provided in this appendix and elsewhere in this 
report.   
 
The estimates in this final report represent our best estimates of the short-run economic impacts 
of the fiscal options we analyzed, and they replace any earlier estimates.  Below we provide a 
brief description of the reasons for differences between the estimates in this report and earlier 
estimates. 
 
All our earlier estimates were high-scenario estimates based on the IMPLAN spending 
assumptions.   
 
We prepared the estimates shown below for an article in the January 2016 edition of Alaska 
Business Monthly (http://www.akbizmag.com/Alaska-Business-Monthly/January-2016/Alaskas-
Economy/).  We noted that these were “preliminary calculations for an ongoing ISER study of 
economic impacts of state fiscal options.”  
 
 
 
While the spending cut estimates for the Alaska Business Monthly (ABM) article are the same as 
those in Table D-12, the estimated impacts are different for an “income tax” and for a 
“Permanent Fund Dividend reallocation” than for the income tax and dividend cuts we estimated 
in Table 12, and they also differ in their relative magnitudes.  There are a number of reasons for 
these differences, all of which derive from the fact that the estimates published in the magazine 
were based on simpler assumptions made when we were at a much earlier stage of our analysis.   
 
For these earlier estimates we modeled the impacts of dividend cuts as reductions in average 
employee compensation, and we modeled impacts of an income tax as specific reductions by 
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income group. We did not adjust for household size in order to derive impacts of dividend cuts 
by income group.  This choice meant that the estimated multiplier impacts of dividend cuts were 
smaller because our estimates did not account for the fact that lower-income households spend 
more of their income than their higher income counterparts. We did not adjust for residency, so 
we implicitly assumed that both the income tax and the dividend cuts would equally affect the 
Alaska economy.  We also did not adjust for the decline in federal tax liability the households 
experience as a result of not receiving the dividend or paying a state income tax. 
 
By contrast, in this final report we treat both income taxes and PFD reductions as income 
reductions, which means that the same taxes and savings are removed by income group.  We 
adjust for household size by income group in order to generate the appropriate PFD reductions. 
We adjust for residency status in order to allow for the fact that the income generated by a 
dividend cut is almost all coming from Alaskans, while the income generated by an income tax 
has a much larger non-resident component.  This is probably the most important reason why in 
this report the relative impacts we estimate for an income tax are smaller than for a dividend cut. 
We also adjust for the decline in the federal tax liability resulting from a state income tax or PFD 
reductions.  All these adjustments together make this final analysis a much better estimate of the 
implications of the two options.  
 
In short, the estimates for the magazine article were based on the preliminary analysis we had 
done at that time.  Our estimates for this report are based on much more detailed (and time-
consuming) analysis and thinking we have done since that time.  
 
Gunnar Knapp also provided presentations called “Economic Impacts of Alaska Fiscal Options:  
Overview of Draft Conclusions” to the House Finance Committee on February 25, 2016 and to 
the House Labor and Commerce Committee on February 29 and March 2, 2016.  After we had 
given these presentations, we discovered a small error in our calculations for the revenue impacts 
of the tax and dividend cut options.  Correcting for this error resulted in small changes in the 
short-run economic impacts shown in this report, compared with those in the presentations, but 
did not change the absolute or relative estimates in any significant way. 
 
Limitations of Short-Run Economic Impacts Analysis 
It is important to be aware of several significant limitations to our short-run economic impact 
estimates, which reflect inherent limitations of economic impact analysis using input-output (IO) 
models such as the IMPLAN model.   
 
First, IO models are demand-oriented and assume that the supply of outputs is unlimited. This 
means that an increase in demand is always met by an increase in supply. Put differently, there 
are no supply constraints.  In general, this limitation would be more important if we were 
estimating the impacts of increasing spending or dividends or reducing taxes than it is for 
estimating the impacts of reducing spending or dividends and increasing taxes.  
  
Second, IO models assume that commodity and factor prices are fixed regardless of any change 
in demand. Due to these assumptions, IO models tend to overestimate the effects of policy 
changes (Miller and Blair, 1985).   For example, we did not take into account the fact that job 
loss impacts might potentially affect labor markets, causing wage rates to fall—which might in 
turn cause some employers to hire more labor, thus partially offsetting the original impact of the 
job losses. 
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Third, IO models assume zero substitution elasticities in production and consumption. The lack 
of substitution coupled with the fixed prices means that results from IO models are best suited 
for understanding the short-run implications of shocks.  
 
The options we modeled are approximations of how the different options would translate into 
statewide economic impacts. The impact of government job and earning cuts would depend on 
the salaries of those affected and the departments in which they were employed. On the earnings 
side, benefit cuts would reduce overall compensation but do not affect near-term consumption of 
the workers.  
 
Our sales tax estimates assume that households view the taxes as a reduction in income and 
therefore cut back on all expenditure components in proportion to their personal expenditure 
mix, without changing the mix of goods and services they purchase. This household response is a 
reasonable one but implicitly assumes that the tax is passed on to the consumer. 
 
